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Lecture
VIRTUAL CLIENTS: AN IDEA IN SEARCH OF
A THEORY (WITH LIMITS)
Stephen Gillers∗
I. INTRODUCTION
“The client is no longer simply the person who walks into a law
office.”1 But, then, who else might it be?
Judge Arthur Sprecher, prescient, wrote the quoted words nearly
three decades ago. They were true then, truer today. No longer can
lawyers safely subscribe to the traditional understanding, as I shall call
it, which posits an identifiable client to whom, and to whom only, the
lawyer owes nearly the entire gamut of professional duties. True, the
great majority of clients today are “the person who walks into a law
office” if we include in that figurative description the lawyer who walks
into the client’s office, the lawyer and client who meet (for example) via
telephone or e-mail, and the lawyer who visits the client in prison,
perhaps following court appointment. The traditional understanding
simplifies the lawyer’s life. As Lord Brougham famously said, “an
advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client.”2 Brougham had a great advantage.
He could be confident that he could know who his client was, but
modern lawyers cannot.
For strategic reasons, Brougham may have chosen to exaggerate
what he was prepared to do for Queen Caroline, but he captured an idea
still widely shared: A lawyer’s task is to achieve the client’s goal,
ethically and legally, come what may.3 He “knows” only the client, or
almost only. Even in the traditional view, lawyers have duties to
∗

Emily Kempin Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. This Article
was presented as the Tabor Lecture at the Valparaiso University School of Law on April 12,
2007. I thank the D’Agostino/Greenberg Fund for the assistance that permitted me to
work on this Article.
1
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1318 (7th Cir. 1978).
2
GREAT BRITAIN PARLIAMENT HOUSE OF LORDS, CAROLINE, 2 THE TRIAL OF THE QUEEN
OF ENGLAND, IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1820 3 (1821).
3
Variations on this idea appear in the ethics rules of some American jurisdictions. See,
e.g., D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3(b)(1) (2007) (“(b) A lawyer shall not
intentionally: (1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of a client through reasonably available
means permitted by law and the disciplinary rules”).
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opposing lawyers and parties, the public, and the courts, but these pale
by comparison to the duties owed clients.4 Traditionalists maintain that
is a good thing because, for two reasons, the less lawyers owe to others,
the better. First, lawyers do not then have to worry as much about civil
or disciplinary liability, a worry that might detract from the vigor with
which they pursue a client’s interests.5 Second, the creation of duties to
others places limits on the lawyer’s professional freedom and the ability
of others to hire her. If, for example, a lawyer acquires a duty to a third
party by virtue of representing a client, she (and all lawyers in her firm
by imputation) may not be able to accept a new client if the new work
may require her to violate that duty.6
“I am my client’s junkyard dog,” a prominent law professor once
told a legal ethics conference I attended.7 Others have used the
metaphor “pit bull.”8 Although few lawyers are likely to embrace this
canine imagery, most would accept the qualities they imply—scrappy,
relentless, and fierce. Surely, no lawyer would invoke dogs of milder
disposition. “I am my client’s poodle?”
The traditional understanding remains dominant, but qualified by
duties to others that lawyers cannot ignore (or ignore at their peril). One
of those qualifications, the subject of this Article, consists of judicial
developments that give lawyers professional duties to those I shall call
virtual clients. What is a virtual client? A virtual client is a person or
entity to whom the lawyer owes at least some of the duties lawyers owe
traditional clients whether or not (and most often not) the lawyer has
Examples reside in duties of candor to the court. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2003); see also id. at R.4.2 (the prohibition against communicating with the
represented person); Id. at R.4.4(a) (the prohibition against using “means that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person.”); Id. at
R.4.4(b) (the requirement to “promptly notify the sender” where a lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that she has received documents inadvertently sent).
5
See, e.g., Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 100 (1982).
6
See, e.g., In re Gabapentin Patent Lit., 407 F. Supp. 2d 607 (D.N.J. 2005) (discussing that,
in common interest arrangements, lawyers acquire duties to non-clients that thereafter
prevent partners of those lawyers from appearing for firm clients adverse to the nonclients).
7
Identification has been omitted because it was many years ago and because I do not
think speakers should be burdened with casual (metaphorical) oral comments at bar
meetings.
8
Deborah Rhode, Opening Remarks: Professionalism, 52 S.C. L. REV. 458, 462 (2001)
(quoting a Washington, D.C. lawyer as saying: “[I]f clients want ‘pit bull’ lawyers who
engage in pit bull tactics . . . then that’s what those clients are going to get.”); see also
William Hornsby, Clashes of Class and Cash: Battles from the 150 Years War to Govern Client
Development, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 255, 271 (2005) (discussing lawyers who successfully defended
a grievance alleging misconduct for using the telephone number 1-800-PIT-BULL).
4
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agreed to accept those duties. A virtual client is not someone who has
retained a lawyer to provide a legal service solely for herself (whether or
not the lawyer is charging a fee). Nor is it someone whom the lawyer
has accepted as a client though paid by others who may or may not also
be clients. Nor is it someone whom a court has assigned the lawyer to
represent. A traditional client comes to a lawyer ex ante, through
agreement or court assignment.9 A person becomes a virtual client
because somewhere in the course of the representation of a traditional
client, even after it ends, a court will say so. Duties to virtual clients, I
will argue, should be created cautiously and with awareness of the
central value of the original understanding, namely to assure clients the
help of legal experts whose loyalty and concern run mainly to them. I
will suggest a methodology for recognition of virtual clients but I will
also try to identify limits to the doctrine intended to preserve the values
encompassed by the traditional understanding. While the category of
virtual client is here to stay, there is a danger that it will be recognized
casually, without true need or awareness of the effect of its recognition
on the central values of the traditional relationship and with a serious,
even a profound, effect on advocacy.
What has been said so far and will be said hereafter requires us to
tweak Judge Sprecher’s language a bit. Perhaps his sentence should
read; “The person to whom a lawyer owes one or more professional
duties is no longer simply the person who walks into a law office.” Less
elegant, certainly, but more accurate.
We are addressing the
circumstances in which a lawyer may owe a person all or (more likely)
some of the professional duties owed traditional clients and whether that
person is called a virtual client or something else is less important. The
term virtual client is convenient. Judge Sprecher would likely agree.
After citing several cases in which lawyers owed duties to others, he
wrote:
In none of the above categories or situations did the
disqualified or disadvantaged lawyer or law firm
actually represent the “client” in the sense of a formal or
even express attorney-client relation. In each of those
categories either an implied relation was found or at

9
Absent court assignment or class certification, the attorney-client relationship is
traditionally a product of contract, express or implied. Cox v. Geary, 624 S.E.2d 16, 22 (Va.
2006).
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least the lawyer was found to owe a fiduciary obligation
to the laymen.10
Two long held and compatible assumptions in the world of lawyer
regulation are at stake in decisions whether or not to give lawyers duties
to persons other than traditional clients and, if so, which persons and
what duties. Both assumptions—which have something close to
canonical status in the world of lawyer regulation—are legitimate bases
for rules regulating the bar because each encompasses values that
deserve respect. The question is how much respect when balanced
against other interests. The values behind either assumption can be
exaggerated or slighted as the profession and society change, leading to
rules that misplace priorities.
The first assumption underlies what may be called the consumer
protection model of lawyer regulation. Because lawyers are trained in
the law and legal institutions, and clients mostly are not, clients and
others need rules that protect them from lawyers who may, consciously
or not, overreach or somehow take advantage of them. The result is a
consumer protection code, where the product sold is legal services and
the client is the consumer.11
The second assumption is behind the Lord Brougham model. It sees
the lawyer-client relationship as one in which the lawyer stands up for
the client against all the world. The lawyer is the client’s gladiator or
champion. Courts, in this view, should not give lawyers duties to others
because doing so may compromise the zeal with which the lawyer fights
for the interests of the client. Although this assumption works best in
litigation with clearly defined adversaries and an umpire, it influences
our view of professional relationships broadly. The first assumption,
then, purports to protect the client from the lawyer. The second
assumption purports to insure that the lawyer is free to protect the client
from everyone else.
I count seven types of virtual clients. While these are not equally
well recognized in law, and while the duties a lawyer owes to the
members in each category (if any) vary by category and among

Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978).
Much in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires or proscribes conduct
to protect clients, prospective clients, or third persons from lawyers. See generally Stephen
Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model
Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243 (1985).
10
11
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jurisdictions, each category has substantial recognition. The categories
are:
1. The clients of other lawyers in a common interest arrangement
(also, but inaccurately, known as joint defense agreements);12
2. the subsidiaries, parent, or sister companies of a corporate client;13
3. the members of a lawyer’s trade group client;14
4. the principal of an agent-client (or beneficiary of a fiduciary client)
who has hired the lawyer to assist in protecting the principal (or
beneficiary);15
5. intended third party beneficiaries of a legal service performed for
a client;16
6. a third party who gives a lawyer confidential information to assist
in providing legal services for a traditional client because of some
special relationship between the third party and the traditional
client; and,17
7. a third party that, as the lawyer does or should realize, will rely on
the accuracy of the lawyer’s factual assertions or legal analysis on
behalf of a traditional client.18
I recognize that these categories do not have fixed boundaries;
however, they share some qualities. In fact, the last four categories can
fall under an umbrella description—persons who, as the lawyer can or

See, e.g., Nat’l Med. Enters., Inc. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. 1996).
See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 20 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
14
Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981).
15
See, e.g., Oxdine v. Overturf, 973 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1999) (noting that “in most cases,
the personal representative’s attorney will have a fiduciary duty to represent the interests
of all statutory heirs,” but rejecting the duty in the current matter because of a “conflict”
between the personal representative and the heir).
16
See, e.g., McLane v. Russell, 546 N.E.2d 499 (Ill. 1989) (duty of attorney who drafted a
will to testator’s intended beneficiary).
17
See, e.g., Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
18
See, e.g., Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz & Wilson v. Central Bank of Denver, N.A., 892
P.2d 230 (Colo. 1995). This category does not include formal opinion letters that a client
asks its lawyer to provide to an opponent, generally in a transaction. Because of the
formality of the event, the lawyer knows that he or she is assuming a traditional duty—of
competence—to the recipient.
12
13
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should foresee, will directly benefit from or will rely on the lawyer’s
work. Yet each of the seven categories deserves individual analysis.
Even outside these categories, lawyers have duties to third persons
who are neither traditional nor virtual clients. I will describe these
tangential situations in Part II of this Article and explain why they are
doctrinally distinct from the seven virtual client categories. Part III will
then develop the seven categories with examples from case law and
other authority. Part IV will tease out two distinct theories behind the
creation of these categories and argue that some of the categories may
compromise the value of client loyalty and concern that is at the center of
the traditional understanding, without corresponding benefit.
II. DUTIES TO THIRD PERSONS WHO ARE NOT VIRTUAL CLIENTS
In several circumstances, lawyers may owe duties to third persons
who are not their clients. These must be distinguished from the virtual
client categories. I want to focus on two of those circumstances.
A. Violation of Substantive Law
First, like anyone else, a lawyer who knowingly assists a client’s
violation of fiduciary duty or other intentional misconduct may be sued
along with the client. The fact that the lawyer purported to act in his or
her professional role will not be a defense any more than if the lawyer
assisted a client’s crime.
Consider Thornwood, Inc. v. Jenner & Block.19 The complaint alleged
the following: Two business partners, Thornton and Follensbee, were
developing land as a residential community and golf course.20 The effort
was running into trouble when Follensbee started negotiating with PGA
Tour Golf Course Properties (PGA) to designate the course a
Tournament Players Course (TPC).21 An earlier effort to do that had
failed.22 In violation of his fiduciary duty as a partner, Follensbee did
not tell Thornton about his revived negotiation with PGA.23 He then
purchased Thornton’s partnership interest.24 Jenner & Block represented
Follensbee on the buyout and on the renewed negotiation with PGA.25
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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Four years later, when Thornton had discovered this history (it is unclear
how), he sued Jenner & Block, alleging that the firm knew about its
client’s breach.26 The court’s opinion spends a lot of time on whether the
releases accompanying the buyout were effective (concluding they were
not on the facts alleged), then upholds Thornton’s claims that Jenner &
Block aided and abetted Follensbee’s breach:
Certainly, as Jenner & Block points out, mere receipt of
copies of letters authored by Follensbee, which expose
his breach of fiduciary duty, probably does not
constitute aiding and abetting under Illinois law. Here,
however, Thornton alleges more. He alleges that Jenner
& Block aided and abetted by knowingly and
substantially assisting Follensbee in breaching his
fiduciary duty by (1) communicating the competitive
advantages available to the Partnership from the
PGA/TPC plan to other parties, but specifically not to
Thornton; (2) expressing Follensbee’s interest in
purchasing Thornton’s interest in the Partnership and
negotiating the purchase of that interest without
disclosing to Thornton the continued negotiations with
the PGA and Potomac; (3) reviewing and counseling
Follensbee with regard to the production of investment
offering memoranda, financial projections, and
marketing literature, which purposely failed to identify
Thornton as a partner; and (4) drafting, negotiating,
reviewing, and executing documents, including the
Jenner & Block and Follensbee Releases, relating to the
purchase of Thornton’s interest and the PGA/TPC plan
with knowledge that Thornton was not aware of the
PGA/TPC plan. All of these acts are alleged to have
been perpetrated by Jenner & Block while it had
knowledge that Thornton and Follensbee were partners,
that Follensbee had a duty to disclose the PGA/TPC
plan to Thornton, and that Follensbee did not disclose
the PGA/TPC plan to Thornton despite having the
opportunity and duty to do so. Importantly, Thornton is
not required to prove his allegations at this time. Thus,
even though Thornton may face an uphill battle in

26

Id. at 762.
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proving his claims, we cannot at this time affirm the
dismissal of his complaint.27
Or take another example.28 William Granewich was a shareholder in
a closely held Oregon corporation.29
He sued the other two
shareholders, Harding and Alexander-Hergert, claiming that they
breached their fiduciary duties to him by “depriving [him] of his
position as a director, of the value of his shares of stock, of his further
employment with and compensation from FFG [the company], and of
the benefits of participating in the corporate affairs of FFG.”30
Granewich also named the company’s outside counsel as defendants,
charging that they knowingly assisted the other shareholders in violating
fiduciary duties to him.31 Although there was no Oregon law directly on
point, the state supreme court concluded that the legal authorities were
“virtually . . . unanimous in expressing the proposition that one who
knowingly aids another in the breach of a fiduciary duty is liable to the
one harmed thereby. That principle readily extends to lawyers.”32
Reinstating the complaint against the lawyers, the court wrote:
The complaint alleges that the lawyers entered into an
agreement with Harding and Alexander–Hergert to take
such actions as may be necessary to squeeze plaintiff out
of FFG and to deprive plaintiff of the value of his FFG
stock, objectives that are alleged to be in breach of
Harding’s and Alexander–Hergert’s fiduciary duties to
plaintiff as majority shareholders and directors. . . . In
addition, the amended complaint alleges that the
lawyers knew that the object to be accomplished was the
breach of [these] duties . . . that the lawyers provided
substantial assistance to them in their efforts in that
regard, and that plaintiff was damaged as a result.33

Id. at 768-69.
Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999).
29
Id. at 790.
30
Id. at 791.
31
Id. at 790.
32
Id. at 793-94 (footnotes and citations omitted).
33
Id. at 795. See also United States v. Ross, 190 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 1999). Attorney Mark
Ross was found guilty of drug and money-laundering conspiracies. In part the evidence
against him showed that he had assisted his clients in transferring real property and in
posting a cash bond. Both acts advanced the client’s crimes. The court found “ample
evidence to support a finding that . . . [Ross] knew of and joined in both conspiracies by
engaging in money laundering in connection with the . . . [real] property.” Id. at 451. Thus,
27
28
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The Oregon court later wrote that the holding in Granewich
depended on the fact that the client of the defendant lawyer was the
corporation, not the co-shareholders whom the plaintiff alleged the
lawyer aided in their breach of their fiduciary duty.34 Reynolds v.
Schrock35 held that lawyers had a qualified privilege to assist a client’s
breach of fiduciary duty so long as they acted within the scope of the
professional relationship.
The claimants in these cases do not fit within the virtual client
categories because the rights they assert are independent of the lawyer’s
professional status. Rather, the claim is that a lawyer, like anyone else, is
(or should be) liable for conduct that assists a breach of fiduciary duty,
an intentional tort (like fraud), or a crime. That assistance does not even
colorably fall within the scope of services lawyers may legitimately offer.
Consequently, we should have no concern that liability for engaging in
this conduct will compromise a lawyer’s willingness to pursue a client’s
goal within the bounds of the law. Whether in any particular situation
the factual allegations support liability is a distinct question. The
allegations do not, in any event, cite a duty to a person standing in the
(virtual) shoes of a client.36
B. Violation of Ethics Rules that Require Protection of Others
Beyond the substantive law, ethics rules are a second source that
may give lawyers duties to third persons. Perhaps the most prominent
development in legal ethics in the last twenty-five years is the increased
authority, or even obligation, of lawyers to protect third persons,
including courts and other tribunals, from harm at the hands of clients or
“the jury could find that Mark Ross knew that drug proceeds would be used to post the
bond for . . . [a third party] with the hope that he would not cooperate with the
government.” Id. at 452.
34
Id.
35
142 P.3d 1062 (Or. 2006).
36
Other conduct falls within the same general category. See, e.g., Morgan Roth &
Morgan Roth v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus P.C., 331 F.2d 406 (3d Cir. 2003) (fraud on
creditors); Gen. Refractories Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2003)
(abuse of process); Zamos v. Stroud, 87 P.3d 802 (Cal. 2004) (malicious prosecution);
Wasmann v. Seidenberg, 248 Cal. Rptr. 744 (Ct. App. 1988) (violation of obligations as an
escrow agent); Rothman v. Jackson, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284, 287 (Ct. App. 1996) (permitting
defamation action against singer Michael Jackson and his lawyers based on press
conference in which the defendants allegedly accused plaintiff, a lawyer, of making “false
accusations against Jackson in order to extort money from him.”). Each of these cases as
well as those cited in the text expose lawyers to the same risks of civil liability as anyone
else, notwithstanding that they may have committed their acts in the course of representing
a client.
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others. Here, I mainly want to focus on ethics rules that mandate
conduct to protect others.
Model Rule 1.6(b) contains six exceptions to the duty of
confidentiality set out in Rule 1.6(a), but all of the exceptions are
permissive.37 For our purposes, they allow lawyers to reveal confidential
information to protect third persons from serious physical injury38 and to
prevent, mitigate, or rectify financial injury caused by a client’s fraud or
crime (as well as to prevent the crime or fraud itself) where the lawyer’s
services are being used or have been used to commit the fraud or crime.39
But in some jurisdictions the exception is mandatory when the threat is
of physical harm.40 In other jurisdictions it is mandatory even when the
injury is financial.41 In one circumstance, the Model Rules require a
lawyer to reveal confidences, namely to remedy a fraud on a tribunal.42

The rule provides:
b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; (2) to
prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or
is using the lawyer’s services; (3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that
is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s
commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has
used the lawyer’s services; (4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s
compliance with these Rules; (5) to establish a claim or defense on
behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against
the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s
representation of the client; or (6) to comply with other law or a court
order.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2003).
38
Id. at R. 1.6(b)(1). The threat does not have to come from the client nor must the
conduct creating the risk be criminal. The ABA adopted this rule in 2002, when it deleted
these two preconditions—that the act be the client’s and a crime. Deleted, also, was the
requirement that the harm be imminent. One consequence is to make it clear that a lawyer
may reveal that a dangerous consumer product is on the market.
39
Id. at R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3).
40
This is so in Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois and Washington State, among other
jurisdictions. See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS 86-93 (2008) (discussing the rules in these jurisdictions, and a compendium of
other significant state variations from the ABA version of Rule 1.6).
41
New Jersey and Wisconsin are in this category. For the variations in these
jurisdictions, see GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 40.
42
ABA Model Rule 3.3 provides in part:
37
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This is not the place to catalogue the circumstances in which any of these
duties arise either under the Model Rules or state variations. But it is
important to recognize that the duties exist and that they run to nonclients (or the tribunal directly and therefore the adversary indirectly).
The consequences for violation of these rules are not entirely clear.
Of course, failure to warn or reveal confidential information when a rule
requires it will support professional discipline. The harder question is
whether the failure can lead to civil liability. Harder still is whether
failure can support civil liability when the confidentiality exception is
only permissive, not mandatory. So far as can be determined, no court
opinion has yet supported a lawyer’s civil liability to a third person solely
for failure to comply with a permissive or mandatory disclosure rule in a
jurisdiction’s ethical code for lawyers. Yet a theory of liability would not
be difficult to construct, at least if the confidentiality exception were
mandatory.43 In any event, the existence of an exception coupled with a
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or
law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or
law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; (2) fail to disclose
to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to
the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not
disclosed by opposing counsel; or (3) offer evidence that the lawyer
knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called
by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to
know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures,
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse
to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal
matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. (b) A lawyer who
represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a
person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or
fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable
remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.
(c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the
conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires
disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2003).
The word “tribunal” is defined to include a “court, an arbitrator in a binding
arbitration proceeding, or a legislative body, administrative agency, or other body acting in
an adjudicative capacity.” MODEL RULE 1.0(m). Further, Model Rule 3.9 imposes the duties
contained in Rule 3.3(a) through (c) on a “lawyer representing a client before a legislative
body or administrative agency in a nonadjudicative proceeding.” MODEL RULE 3.9.
43
This is particularly true in the few jurisdictions that have held that a violation of a rule
of professional conduct can in an of itself be the basis for civil liability. See, e.g., Griva v.
Davison, 637 A.2d 830, 846-47 (D.C. App. 1994) (“case law confirms that a violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility or of the Rules of Professional Conduct can constitute a
breach of the attorney’s common law fiduciary duty to the client”). Even in jurisdictions
where the rule permits but does not require revelation of confidential information to
protect third parties from financial injury or to rectify injury that has occurred, the
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lawyer’s failure to invoke it would increase the potential for liability
because the lawyer’s opponent would be able to offer the ethical
authority or obligation as some evidence of violation of a civil law duty.
The lawyer would not be able to defend on the ground that revelation
would have violated the jurisdiction’s ethical rules. True, the Scope
section of the Model Rules cautions that the Rules “are not designed to
be a basis for civil liability.”44 But a few sentences later, impelled no
doubt by substantial case law ignoring the contrary view in previous
versions of the Rules, the Scope concludes that “since the Rules do
establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of a Rule
may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.”45
III. THE UNIVERSE OF VIRTUAL CLIENTS EXPLAINED
Duties to virtual clients, by contrast, do not arise because of a rule of
substantive civil or criminal law that is applicable to everyone including
lawyers, nor because of an ethics rule whose purpose is the protection of
third persons. They arise instead for one of two reasons. First, they may
arise simply because of the nature of the relationship between the
traditional client and the virtual client. Second, they may arise because
of the nature of that relationship where, in addition, the lawyer has
received information from the virtual client.
Merely receiving
information from a third party is insufficient to create duties to the
source of the information. Lawyers receive information from many
sources in representing clients without thereby creating a duty to the
source. A contrary rule would make law practice as we know it
impossible. Although I consider seven categories of virtual clients, I do
not suggest that they are exclusive or that others will not hereafter
appear.
language of Rule 1.6(b)(2) and (3), the duty can become mandatory through the operation
of Rule 4.1, which requires a lawyer to disclose information to “avoid assisting a criminal
or fraudulent act by the client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.” MODEL CODE
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003). A permissive exception to confidentiality means the
disclosure is not “prohibited.” The duty imposed by Rule 4.1 will therefore arise if nondisclosure would, under substantive law, mean the lawyer is “assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act.” See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 3 (2003).
44
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT. R. Scope. (2007).
45
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2003). See generally Note, The Evidentiary Use of the
Ethics Codes in Legal Malpractice: Erasing a Double Standard, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1102 (1996).
While the use of ethics rules violations as some evidence of civil liability is most frequent in
malpractice cases, the Model Rules themselves are not so restrictive. See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(2) (2000), which would allow consideration of a
rules violation “to the extent that (i) the rule . . . was designed for the protection of persons
in the position of the claimant and (ii) proof of the content and construction of such a rule
or statute is relevant to the claimant’s claim.”
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A. Common Interest Arrangements
The concept here is simple. Two or more clients, represented by two
or more lawyers, have a common legal interest. The most frequent
example is of two or more people facing indictment or criminal trial,
each with his or her own counsel. They have a common interest
(avoiding conviction) and a common enemy (the prosecutor).46 Because
this is the most frequent example, the doctrine is sometimes mislabeled
the joint defense privilege. But the doctrine does not protect defendants
only (let alone solely defendants in criminal cases); plaintiffs can claim it
too.47 And some courts have allowed the doctrine’s protection where
there is no pending or impending litigation, where the matter is entirely
transactional, so long as the common interest is legal, not commercial.48
However, other courts have refused to go that far.49 The label “joint
defense privilege” is incorrect in a more fundamental way. The doctrine
does not create a privilege. It describes a rule that avoids loss of a
privilege that is otherwise present. Lawyer-client communications
ordinarily lose their privilege if a third person who is not reasonably
necessary to the professional relationship is present. Absent the
common interest rule, the presence of another lawyer’s client, or the
other lawyer, would defeat privilege for the communication. The rule
avoids that result so long as one of the lawyers in a valid common
interest arrangement is a party to the communication.50
A complication arises if one client in the common interest
arrangement claims that by virtue of it another client’s lawyer owes him
or her a duty of some kind. For example, Lawyer A and Client A may
have a common interest arrangement with Lawyers B and C and their
clients (B and C). Whether an arrangement is explicitly described as
among the clients only or also includes the lawyers need not concern us;
if, however, the lawyers are parties, it will be easier for a client to argue
that the lawyer for another client owes her professional duties. Client

Of course, their interests may not be identical because either may have a factual or
legal defense that is of no help to the other or may even harm the other. See, e.g., Griffin v.
McVicar, 84 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 1996), where the two homicide defendants had a common
enemy—the prosecutor; but one also had a defense (present at the crime but not a
participant) that was factually unavailable to the other, who had to rely on alibi and
mistaken identification. Id.
47
This is clearly explained in United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1989).
48
In re Regents of the University of California, 101 F.3d 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
49
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 676 N.Y.S.2d 727
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1998), aff’d 692 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1st Dept. 1999).
50
See, e.g., Volpe v. Conroy, Simberg & Ganon, P.A., 720 So. 2d 537 (Fla. App. 1998).
46
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A’s interests may become adverse to those of clients B and C.51 Lawyer
A may then find herself in the position of either asserting claims against
or having to cross-examine Clients B and C. Can she? Or will her prior
participation in the common interest arrangement preclude her?
Perhaps she learned confidential information in the common interest
arrangement that she can now use to their disadvantage. Is she
obligated to protect that information? Does the existence of the common
interest arrangement create fiduciary duties to clients of other lawyers?
Does it turn them into traditional clients? To the extent that the answer
to any of these last three questions is yes, the consequences to the
lawyer’s work, including her (and her firm’s) ability to continue to
represent her client, can be significant. That prospect raises a fourth
question: Can the members of the common interest arrangement
displace an affirmative answer by agreement?
Courts have given lawyers in common interest arrangements
fiduciary duties to the clients of other lawyers, and at least some courts
have gone further, holding that lawyers in a common interest
arrangement have an “implied” attorney-client relationship with clients
of other lawyers.52
The most common consequence will be
51
For example, A may settle with the common opponent and agree to testify. This is
most common in criminal cases where one of several defendants reach a plea bargain in
exchange for testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (N.D. Cal.
2003). But it can also happen in a civil case. See, e.g., In Trinity Ambulance Service, Inc. v.
G. & L. Ambulance Services, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Conn. 1984). One of two plaintiffs
in an antitrust action realigned as a defendant after reaching an accord with the original
defendant. Id. While a plaintiff, its counsel had participated in joint strategy sessions with
the other plaintiff and its counsel. Id. The court disqualified the attorney for the realigned
defendant after concluding that the attorney had had a professional relationship with the
remaining plaintiff, which had divulged confidences in the belief that it was “approaching
the attorney in a professional capacity with the intent to secure legal advice.” Id. at 1283.
52
In United States v. Henke, 222 F.3d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 2000), the court held that “[a] joint
defense agreement establishes an implied attorney-client relationship” between a lawyer
for one defendant and the co-defendant. As a result, when the co-defendant plead guilty
and appeared as a prosecution witness against the lawyer’s client, the lawyer’s motion to
withdraw to avoid cross-examining the co-defendant should have been granted. United
States v. Almeida, 341 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2003), reaches a contrary result, concluding that
by deciding to cooperate and testify against former co-defendants, a government witness
has waived the privilege for communications with the lawyers of the co-defendants. In
United States v. Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2003), Judge Patel, perhaps
impelled by Henke, required lawyers in a multi-defendant drug and weapons conspiracy
case to put all joint defense agreements in writing and submit them to the court. Id. at 1071.
After reviewing the submissions, the judge concluded that the agreements had to be
redrafted. Id. at 1085. She read Henke’s reference to an “implied attorney-client
relationship” to be limited to the creation of a duty of confidentiality only, not a duty of
loyalty, to the clients of other lawyers. Henke, 222 F.3d at 637. She required that the
agreements before her specifically waive this duty of confidentiality. Her order follows:
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disqualification from representation of the lawyer’s traditional client.53
Liability for malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty would be a
doctrinally modest extension.
In re Gabapentin Patent Litigation54 is an unremarkable example of the
duties a lawyer (and therefore his entire firm) might unwittingly assume
by virtue of a common interest arrangement, despite seemingly sensible
precautions that the court ruled were inadequate. Attorneys Lindvall
and Clarke had represented IVAX, a defendant in Gabapentin, while at
the firm Darby & Darby.55 That representation ended in June 2003,
although IVAX remained a party.56 In March 2005, Kaye Scholer was
contemplating offers to Lindvall and Clarke.57 But, at the time, Kaye
Scholer was representing Pfizer, the plaintiff in Gabapentin, in another
matter in the same court.58 The firm anticipated that Pfizer might ask it
to substitute in as its counsel in Gabapentin.59 Obviously, if Lindvall and
Clarke were then working at Kaye Scholer, the firm would be in the
position of being adverse to their former client IVAX in the very same
litigation in which they had represented IVAX.60 So the firm conditioned
offers to Lindvall and Clarke on IVAX’s consent to screen them from the
representation of Pfizer adverse to IVAX if they joined Kaye Scholer.61
For the foregoing reasons, the Court rules as follows:
(1) Any joint defense agreement entered into by defendants must be
committed to writing, signed by defendants and their attorneys, and
submitted in camera to the court for review prior to going into effect.
(2) Each joint defense agreement submitted must explicitly state that it
does not create an attorney-client relationship between an attorney and
any defendant other than the client of that attorney. No joint defense
agreement may purport to create a duty of loyalty.
(3) Each joint defense agreement must contain provisions conditionally
waiving confidentiality by providing that a signatory attorney crossexamining any defendant who testifies at any proceeding, whether
under a grant of immunity or otherwise, may use any material or other
information contributed by such client during the joint defense.
(4) Each joint defense agreement must explicitly allow withdrawal
upon notice to the other defendants.
Id. In effect, Judge Patel required the defendants to give up the protection that she read
Henke’s default rule to provide. Obviously, then, the parties to a common interest
arrangement can reach the same agreement on their own.
53
In re Gabapentin Pat. Lit., 407 F. Supp. 2d 607 (D.N.J. 2005).
54
Id.
55
Id. at 609.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 610.
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IVAX gave consent and the lawyers went to work at the firm.62 Kaye
Scholer then appeared for Pfizer in Gabapentin.63 IVAX’s co-defendants
moved to disqualify the firm.64 The question before the court was
whether Lindvall and Clarke, and by imputation Kaye Scholer, had any
duty to IVAX’s co-defendants.65 The court held that they did because of
a joint defense agreement (“JDA”) among IVAX and its co-defendants.
“In assessing this position, the Court must consider whether the JDA
(and actions taken pursuant thereto) created a fiduciary relationship or
implied attorney-client relationship among all the parties thereto and
their respective counsel, thus placing the co-defendants in a position to
seek disqualification of Kaye Scholer.”66 The court looked at the JDA
and inferred a duty to the co-defendants:
An examination of the terms of the JDA reveals a clear
intent that any voluntarily-shared information would
remain confidential and be protected by the attorneyclient privilege. For example, the JDA states that the
signatories are required to “take all steps necessary to
maintain the privileged and confidential nature of the
information.”67
This and other language permitted the court “to conclude that an
implied attorney-client relationship arose between Mr. Lindvall and Ms.
Clarke, as counsel for Ivax, and the other . . . [defendants] by virtue of
their joint participation in the defense of the Gabapentin matter.”68
While the court’s conclusion prevented Kaye Scholer from representing
Pfizer, the opponent in the litigation, its analysis is potentially more
consequential. No lawyer for any of the parties to the joint defense
agreement would be able to continue representing his or her client in the
event adverse positions emerged between or among the parties to the
Id.
Id. at 611.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 611-12.
67
Id. at 613.
68
Id. at 614. The court also found a fiduciary relationship. Id. at 615. The fact that
Lindvall and Clarke were screened did not change the result. Id. The New Jersey
professional conduct rules recognize screening of lateral lawyers, but only if those lawyers
did not have “primary responsibility” for the matter at their prior firm. NEW JERSEY RULE
1.10(c)(1). However, Lindvall and Clarke did have primary responsibility. But imputation
of their status would only have been proper under Rule 1.10(a) if the reason for their
disqualification was a former client conflict, not some other reason. Consequently, the
court’s finding of an “implied attorney-client relationship” with the co-defendants was
essential to its conclusion.
62
63
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agreement. That conclusion necessarily follows from the decision to
label the relationship between any lawyer and another lawyer’s client as
an “implied attorney-client relationship.”69 So, for example, if it came to
pass that there was adversity among all the co-defendants—as might
happen if it became necessary to allocate responsibility for each
defendant’s proportionate share of damages—they would each have to
get new lawyers. That disruptive consequence is not one the court seems
to have recognized.
The basis for a lawyer’s duties to other members of the common
interest arrangement is: first, the fact of the relationship created by the
arrangement; and, second, the fact that because of this relationship the
lawyer may have learned information about the other clients in it.70
B. Affiliates of a Corporate Client
Recurring questions for lawyers whose corporate clients are
members of a family of companies are: When does the representation of
one corporate family member create duties to other members of the
corporate family? What is the nature of those duties? Do they
encompass the entire package of duties subsumed in the attorney-client
relationship or something else? For example, a lawyer may represent a
subsidiary of a corporate parent. Does she have duties to the parent or
to its other subsidiaries, and, if so, what are they? This is a sensitive
subject because an affirmative answer, depending on its breadth, can
have significant consequences to the work of a lawyer, especially when
the traditional client is in a family with dozens or hundreds of affiliates,
whose identity may change monthly. The broader the duties and the
In re Gabapentin Patent Litigation, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 609.
The Gabapentin court did not identify specific confidential information that could be
used to the disadvantage of the other defendants. Id. at 607. Instead, it inferred, from
language in the agreement referring to confidential information, that relevant confidences
were shared. Id. at 609. Under the substantial relationship test as it conventionally
operates, the former client seeking disqualification does not have to identify the
confidential information at risk but only that the current matter is substantially related to
the matter on which the opposing firm once represented it. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) (2003). The existence of the relationship is meant to support the
conclusion that relevant confidences were imparted and endangered. Gabapentin is
different. There is no question of a substantial relationship. The matter in which the
lawyers represented IVAX and the matter in which Kaye Scholer wished to represent Pfizer
are the same. The Gabapentin court instead drew its inference from the text of the JDA.
Gabapentin, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 612. Unclear is what the result would have been had the JDA
omitted reference to confidential information—i.e., if there had been a joint defense effort
without mention of confidence sharing. Perhaps then testimony that such information was
in fact shared would have been required.
69
70
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larger the population of corporate family affiliates to whom they are
owed, the greater will be the potential exposure to civil liability and also
the exclusion of the lawyer—and because of the imputation rule,
exclusion of the lawyer’s colleagues—from other representations.71
Answers here are not entirely clear. Bar opinions and courts have stated
various tests for determining what if anything a lawyer owes a client’s
corporate affiliates.
ABA Opinion 95-39072 concluded that the representation of one
company will make its corporate affiliate a client only under limited
circumstances.73 Certainly if the law firm and the client agree that
affiliates of the client will (or will not) be deemed clients of the law firm,
that may conclude the matter. Beyond agreement, which may be
implicit, an affiliate of a client may be deemed a client if the two
companies operate as alter egos; if the two companies have integrated
operations and management; if the in-house legal staff handles legal
matters for both the affiliate and the client; or if representation of the
client has provided the law firm with confidential information about the
affiliate that would be relevant in a matter in which the firm has
appeared adverse to the affiliate.74
The ABA Opinion attempted to put one issue to rest, but it has
resurfaced in the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers and some
cases. Its resolution can have significant consequences when law firms
represent a member of a corporate family. Suppose a firm represents
Parent in several matters. It is then retained to bring a claim against
Subsidiary. Assume the claim is factually unrelated to any work the firm
does for Parent. And assume that none of the tests in the ABA Opinion
would make Subsidiary the client of the firm for any purpose. What if
the action against Subsidiary involves a great deal of money? Perhaps it
could put Subsidiary out of business. That in turn may cause Parent
substantial harm. Should the fact that the action could have a serious
financial effect on the firm’s client prevent the firm from acting adversely
71
For example, in 1996, a district judge, ruling on a motion by Sprint to disqualify Jones
Day because the law firm represented another company in the Sprint family, denied the
motion, pointing out that Sprint had “over 250 subsidiaries and affiliated entities,” while
Jones Day had “1098 attorneys spread over 20 world-wide offices.” Rueben H. Donnelly
Corp. v. Sprint Publ’g and Adver., Inc., 1996 WL 99902 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
72
ABA Opinion 95-390.
73
Id.
74
In addition, a law firm will have a conflict if the representation adverse to one
member of a corporate family will be compromised by its reluctance to antagonize the
client member of the corporate family. In that instance, the conflict is one that affects the
adversary of the non-client affiliate and its consent will remove the conflict.
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to nonclient Subsidiary? On the one hand, much that a law firm may do
for one client could have harmful economic consequences to another
client, yet ordinarily that alone will not create a conflict. Firms may even
represent economic competitors.75 Similarly, it would not ordinarily be
disloyal to real estate client A for its law firm to represent tax client B in a
distinct effort to win an interpretation of the tax code that will, as it
happens, increase A’s income taxes. But is the situation different when a
lawsuit against a client’s affiliate could cause the client substantial
financial injury?
The ABA Opinion concluded that the answer is no.76 Economic
adversity, standing alone, would not create a conflict.
But the
Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers appears to disagree. It states
the general rule that, when a lawyer represents Corporation A, the
company “is ordinarily the lawyer’s client; neither individual officers of
Corporation A nor other corporations in which Corporation A has an
ownership interest, that hold an ownership interest in Corporation A, or
in which a major shareholder in Corporation A has an ownership
interest, are thereby considered to be the lawyer’s client.”77 So far, so
good. But the comment then goes on to say that in some situations this
will not be true, such as “where financial loss or benefit to the nonclient
person or entity will have a direct, adverse impact on the client.”78 The
comment then gives this example:
Lawyer represents Corporation A in local real-estate
transactions. Lawyer has been asked to represent
Plaintiff in a products-liability action against
Corporation
B
claiming
substantial
damages.
Corporation B is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Corporation A; any judgment obtained against
Corporation B will have a material adverse impact on
the value of Corporation B’s assets and on the value of
the assets of Corporation A. Just as Lawyer could not
file suit against Corporation A on behalf of another
client, even in a matter unrelated to the subject of
75
“[S]imultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are
only economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in
unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not
require consent of the respective clients.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. [6]
(2003).
76
ABA Op. 95-390, supra note 72.
77
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. d (2000).
78
Id.
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Lawyer’s representation of Corporation A (see § 128,
Comment e), Lawyer may not represent Plaintiff in the
suit against Corporation B without the consent of both
Plaintiff and Corporation A under the limitations and
conditions provided in § 122.79
A lawyer’s duties to affiliates of a corporate client may be based
solely on the fact of the corporate family relationship, or they may be
based on the fact of the relationship coupled with receipt of the affiliate’s
information. The nature of the lawyer’s duties will vary depending on
the basis for them.
C. Members of a Lawyer’s Trade Group Client
A law firm may pursue the interests of clusters of companies
organized in a trade association. The association is the traditional client
but its function is to protect the common interests of its members. It may
not have interests of its own except as they inure to the benefit of the
members, though it will need legal help to operate as an organization
(for example, real estate, contract, and employment law advice). What
then does the firm owe the membership? The answer to this question
can influence responsibilities in other cluster situations, for example
associations of individuals, a syndicate of banks participating in loans
and joint ventures, but here my focus is trade associations (corporations
embody clusters, too, of the shareholders who own them, but corporate
representation has spawned an independent body of rules80). Courts
have recognized that the client of a lawyer for a trade association is the
association itself, not its members.81 But if the members have provided
79
Id. Interesting though this issue may be, when economic effect appears in the
corporate family context, there is generally a whole lot more going on that would
independently support disqualification. See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 20 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (an action against the non-client subsidiary). If
successful, the claim would have had a profound effect on the parent, a client of the firm.
Id. The parent owned 95 percent of the non-client, which accounted for 90 percent of the
parent’s business. Id. at 21. The court emphasized this fact, however, the case also
involved common management and headquarters among other factors. Id.
80
Model Rule 1.13(a) specifically instructs that a “lawyer employed or retained by an
organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”
Any other rule would create a potential for paralyzing conflicts between the organization’s
lawyers and its constituents (board members, officers, employees, and agents).
Information from an organization’s constituents provided to the entity lawyer is the
entity’s information. The lawyer’s duties of confidentiality and loyalty, as well as the right
to assert privilege, runs to the entity. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub,
471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985).
81
This would seem to be true by definition. See, e.g., Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653
F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981).
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(or are likely to have provided) the lawyer with confidential information
to enable the lawyer to advance the interests of the association and
therefore its members, the lawyer will not be permitted to act adversely
to the source of the information in a matter where the information is
relevant. To this extent, the members are virtual clients.82
The Second Circuit’s analysis in Glueck supports the “information
overlap” basis for finding client identity, but it is actually far more
complex than that.83
Philips Nizer represented the Apparel
Manufacturer’s Association, of which Jonathan Logan was a member, in
labor negotiations.84 It then sued Jonathan Logan in a labor matter.85
The Court wrote:
Disqualification will ordinarily be required whenever
the subject matter of a suit is sufficiently related to the
scope of the matters on which a firm represents an
association as to create a realistic risk either that the
plaintiff will not be represented with vigor or that unfair
advantage will be taken of the defendant.
Moreover . . . once that risk appears, it is appropriate to
assess the risk that prosecution of a plaintiff’s lawsuit by
an association’s law firm will inhibit the free flow of
information from the defendant to the firm that is
necessary for the firm’s proper representation of the
association.86
We see here several concerns beyond the most obvious one—that the
association’s law firm will in fact have received information from the
defendant, a member, which can be used to the member’s disadvantage
in the current action. First, there is the concern that the representation of
the association may lead the law firm to compromise its “vigor” on
behalf of the plaintiff against the association’s member.87 The worry is
that the firm will not wish to unduly antagonize the association, which
may be an important client. This was particularly a concern here
because an executive vice president of the Apparel Manufacturer’s
Association, and a member of its negotiating committee, was president

82
83
84
85
86
87

Id. Glueck uses the term “vicarious client.” Id. at 749.
Id. at 750.
Id. at 748.
Id.
Id. at 750.
Id. at 749.
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of a division of Jonathan Logan, the adverse party in the lawsuit.88
Philips Nizer would then be in a position as counsel to the association to
work with this person in its representation of the association, while also
acting adversely to the company of which she was an officer.89 As such,
the firm might qualify its “vigor.”90 But that is a problem for the
plaintiff, not the association or its member, who may have been willing
to waive the conflict.
A second concern reflected in the excerpt from the court’s opinion is
the “risk . . . that . . . unfair advantage will be taken of a defendant,” here,
Jonathan Logan.91 Reference to “risk” broadens the scope of potential
disqualification.92 The member would not have to prove that in fact the
law firm had received relevant information from the member. It was
sufficient that the firm represented the association in the same area of
law as the litigation adverse to Jonathan Logan. Or to put it another
way, the court created a conclusive presumption that Jonathan Logan
will have given the firm information in the area of labor relations that
could now be used against it. Then the court broadened the scope of the
unacceptable risk even further when it wrote that the pendency of the
lawsuit might inhibit Jonathan Logan from providing the law firm with
information it needs to properly represent the association, thereby
threatening the quality of that representation, too. All of these threats, at
least in combination, supported disqualification of the firm.
The basis for a lawyer’s duties to a member of a trade group client is,
first, the fact of the relationship created by the existence of the group
and, second, the fact that the lawyer may have received or will thereafter
need to receive relevant information from the member in order to
represent the association.
D. The Principal of an Agent-client (or beneficiary of a fiduciary client) Who
has Hired the Lawyer to Assist in Protecting the Principal (or Beneficiary)
Agents hire lawyers to assist them in work for their principals within
the scope of their agency.93 The agency relationship is by definition
fiduciary,94 although not all fiduciaries are agents.95
In some
Id. at 748.
Id.
90
Id. at 749.
91
Id. at 750.
92
Id.
93
Most obviously, lawyers for organizations, including corporations, are necessarily
hired by their agents.
94
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (2000).
88
89

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss3/3

Gillers: Virtual Clients: An Idea in Search of a Theory (with Limits)

2008]

Virtual Clients

819

jurisdictions, a lawyer (like anyone else) who knowingly assists an
agent’s or fiduciary’s act of disloyalty may be jointly liable to the
principal for harm done.96 The trickier questions are these: Does a
lawyer have an affirmative duty to the agent-client’s principal or the
fiduciary’s beneficiary by reason of the professional relationship? For
example, if the lawyer discovers the agent’s or fiduciary’s breach of
fiduciary duty to which the lawyer may or may not have provided
unwitting assistance, what does the lawyer owe the principal or
beneficiary? Or if the lawyer commits malpractice in his or her work for
the principal or beneficiary through the agent or fiduciary, is the lawyer
liable to the former for injuries caused?
Cases are inconsistent on these questions. An Arizona opinion held
that “when an attorney undertakes to represent the guardian of an
incompetent, he assumes a relationship not only with the guardian but
also with the ward.”97 Consequently, if the attorney “knew or should
have known that the guardian was acting adversely to his ward’s
interests, the possibility of frustrating the whole purpose of the
guardianship became foreseeable as did the possibility of injury to the
ward.”98 The court upheld the denial of the lawyer’s summary judgment
motion, finding “a legal relationship and concomitant duty to the
ward.”99 Taking a contrary view is Angel, Cohen & Rogovin v. Oberin Inv.,
N.V.100 The ABA has concluded that the Model Rules do not give a
lawyer any greater obligation to the beneficiary of a fiduciary client than
the lawyer has to any other third party.101 This opinion construes the
Model Rules only. The committee has no authority to construe the law
of fiduciary duty. The court in Trask v. Butler, after setting out a
balancing test, concluded that a trustee or the executor of an estate owes
no duty to beneficiaries in the performance of his task. 102 But Leyba v.
Whitley103 reaches a different conclusion where the fiduciary was a

95
For example, doctors have fiduciary duties to patients but are not thereby agents of
the patient. Moore v. Regents of University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); Taber v.
Riordan, 403 N.E.2d 1349 (Ill. App. 1980).
96
See supra Part II.A (discussing substantive law violations).
97
Fickett v. Superior Court of Pima County, 558 P.2d 988, 990 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).
98
Id.
99
Id. at 991; see also Albright v. Burns, 503 A.2d 386, 389 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986)
(“[T]he attorney had reason to foresee the specific harm which occurred”).
100
512 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1987) (stating that negligently helping a fiduciary violate trust
does not state claim).
101
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 (1994).
102
872 P.2d 1080 (Wash. 1994).
103
907 P.2d 172 (N.M. 1995).
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child’s personal representative
distinguishing a trustee.

in

a

wrongful

[Vol. 42

death

action,

A trustee in the traditional sense has broad discretionary
powers over the estate assets and must make difficult
investment and distribution decisions. The attorney for
the trustee must assist the trustee to make these
discretionary decisions.
A personal representative
under the Wrongful Death Act, by contrast, must simply
distribute any proceeds obtained in accordance with
statute and has no discretionary authority.104
That distinction led the court to find a duty to the beneficiary of the
personal representative.105
The basis for a lawyer’s duty to the principal of an agent-client (or
the beneficiary of a fiduciary) is the relationship between the principal
(or beneficiary) and the agent (or fiduciary). It may also be, however,
that the lawyer has received the principal or beneficiary’s confidential
information, directly or through the agent or fiduciary, and this may be a
separate basis to prevent the lawyer from acting adversely to the
principal or beneficiary on a matter where that information can be used
detrimentally.
E. Intended Third Party Beneficiaries of a Legal Service Performed for a Client
This category resembles the prior one, but it differs in this way.
Here, the client is not an agent or fiduciary, but is instead hiring the
lawyer to perform a service with the intention of benefitting a third
party, possibly along with the client. Unlike an agent, the client has no
fiduciary duty to the third party. The classic example is the testator who
instructs her lawyer to include a bequest to another. The lawyer forgets
to include the bequest. The testator dies and, of course, her intention is
frustrated. She is no longer able to sue. Can the third party beneficiary
of the testator’s instruction sue the lawyer for negligence? Surely there
was negligence. If the beneficiary cannot sue, perhaps the executor of
the estate may do so, which can have the same consequence. Courts are
divided on whether an intended beneficiary has standing to sue the
testator’s lawyer for malpractice.106 Although the will cases are perhaps
Id. at 178.
Id.
106
Id. at 182. Compare Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062 (D.C. 1983) (will
beneficiary has standing), and Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 473-74 (Hawaii 2001) (standing for
104
105
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the most common example for this category, the paradigm can fit
elsewhere. For example, a separation agreement may require the
husband to maintain an existing life insurance policy with his children as
beneficiaries. The wife’s lawyer may then fail to notify the insurance
company that the beneficiaries cannot be changed. The now former
husband eventually changes the beneficiaries to the children of his
second marriage. The change is discovered on his death. Do the
children of the first marriage have a claim for the lost insurance against
their mother’s lawyer?107
The basis for a lawyer’s duty to the third party beneficiary of legal
services performed for a client is the relationship between the client and
the beneficiary.
F. A Third Party Who Gives a Lawyer Confidential Information to Assist in
Providing Legal Services for a Traditional Client because of the Nature of
the Relationship Between the Third Party and the Traditional Client
This category, perhaps the least refined, presents a variation on the
corporate family and trade group issues described above, but there is no
overarching entity. We saw that a lawyer for one member of the
corporate family can acquire duties to an affiliate that gives the lawyer
information to assist her in providing legal services to the client.108 The
difference here is that the source of the information is not a member of a
client’s corporate family. Nor is she a member of a trade group client,
which presents a similar but distinct situation. At the same time, of
course, a lawyer does not, and could not be expected to have a duty to
every source that provides the lawyer with information for use in
trust beneficiaries), with Taylor v. Maile, 127 P.3d 156, 162 (Idaho 2005) (denying standing
to residuary trust beneficiaries). Texas has refused to allow a beneficiary to sue the
testator’s lawyer, but has permitted the estate’s personal representative to do so, even if he
happens also to be a beneficiary. Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192
S.W.3d 780, 787-89 (Tex. 2006). In Belt, the allegation was not that the testator’s lawyers
inadequately drafted a bequest, but rather of negligent tax planning causing depletion of
the estate. Id. at 782.
107
Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96 (Ill. 1982). This was the situation in Pelham,
where the court declined to find that the attorney for the mother had accepted a duty to the
children. Id. at 101. For such a duty to exist, the court wrote, “there must be a clear
indication that the representation by the attorney is intended to directly confer a benefit
upon the third party.” Id. at 100. Elsewhere, the court wrote that “the nonclient must
allege and prove that the intent of the client to benefit the nonclient third party was the
primary or direct purpose of the transaction or relationship.” Id. at 99. In subsequent
cases, courts in Illinois have had to analyze the client’s “primary” purpose. McLane v.
Russell, 546 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ill. 1989).
108
See supra Part III.B.
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representing a client. Rather, there must be a relationship of some sort
between the source and the client, as there is in the corporate family or
trade group context, which induces the source to give the lawyer its
information. But what kind of relationship will suffice? Two appear
influential.
As might be expected, the first is when the lawyer’s work for the
traditional client will directly benefit the source of the information,
thereby providing the source with an incentive to share the information
in the first place. The position of the source, then, may be seen roughly
to approximate the position of a traditional client and create a duty not
to appear adversely to the source in a matter in which the information
can be used to its detriment. But, for this principle to hold, the benefit
must be particular to the source of the information and derive from the
source’s relationship to the traditional client. It cannot be a benefit
enjoyed generally or by many. For example, in seeking a zoning
variance that will allow a client to open a retail business in a particular
neighborhood, area property owners who support the change (perhaps it
will make their lives easier), may provide the lawyer with information
about their own property and needs. That help should not be sufficient
to create a duty to the neighbors.
Contrast Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc.109 Malec was an
employee of NPD between 1972 and 1977. He had two shares, or ten
percent, of NPD’s stock. During the course of his employment, his two
co-owners wished to give him an additional two shares of stock as
compensation for his services. They told him “to find a lawyer who
would structure the transaction in the least costly way.”110 Malec hired
Richard Fine, a partner in Schwartz & Freeman. Fine then devised a plan
for the transfer of the stock. Because the stock had to be evaluated, NPD
gave Fine information on its financial condition, sales trends, and
management. Several months later, Malec left NPD and formed
Analytica to compete with it. He then hired Fine’s law firm to represent
Analytica in an antitrust action against NPD, which moved to disqualify
Fine’s firm.
The firm argued that NPD had never been its client. Malec, it said,
was the only client. The court thought otherwise, but it also wrote that
the issue was immaterial.

109
110
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If NPD did not retain Schwartz & Freeman [Fine’s firm]
– though we think it did – still it supplied Schwartz &
Freeman with just the kind of confidential data that it
would have furnished a lawyer that it had retained; and
it had a right not to see Schwartz & Freeman reappear
within months on the opposite side of a litigation to
which that data might be highly pertinent.111
The second type of relationship between a traditional client and a
source of information that may create duties to the source is not
commercial but personal or familial. Suppose a young woman is
charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. Her mother hires a
lawyer. The client is the driver, not the mother, who is paying the fee.
The mother may also provide the lawyer with confidential information
about the family, including financial and medical information, to assist
in the representation. The daughter may not herself know all of the
information. The parent directly benefits from the lawyer’s goal on
behalf of her daughter, although not economically, as in Analytica. But
neither is the benefit incidental and shared by many, as would be so for
the property owners in the neighborhood of the client who seeks a
zoning variance. So far as the legal service is concerned, the mother and
daughter share what we might call legal identity in seeing the justice
system deal least harshly with the daughter, just as the owners of NPD
Research and Malec shared a legal identity in achieving the most tax
advantageous stock transfer.
The familial context is rare, but one example is Hornish v. Hoffer,112
which tells an unhappy tale. Hornish sued Hoffer, her former boyfriend,
and Hoffer appeared through the Moots law firm.113 Hornish claimed
that she and Hoffer had an agreement that she would help him build a
house on the understanding that she and her children could live in it,
that she had spent more than 1000 hours in the construction of the house,
and that, on completion, Hoffer would not allow her and her children to
live in it.114 Hornish moved to disqualify the Moots law firm on the
ground that it had “previously represented her minor son in a criminal
Id. at 1269. The court cited Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580
F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978), a trade association case in which the court had disqualified
Kirkland & Ellis as counsel for the plaintiff because the firm, in its representation of the
American Petroleum Institute, had received Kerr-McGee’s “confidential information . . . in
connection with the law firm’s work for the Institute.” Id.
112
No. CV05003240, 2006 WL 696542 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2006).
113
Id. at *1.
114
Id.
111
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matter” in which Hoffer was the alleged victim.115 She argued that
disqualification was necessary because her son’s criminal action and the
present action had “the relationship between herself and the defendant”
in common.116 The Moots law firm claimed that it had never had an
attorney-client relationship with Hornish and therefore she could not
seek its disqualification.117 The court held:
This case presents a unique situation, in that the
plaintiff was not a client of . . . [the Moots firm], but
rather participated in discussions with them in which
she revealed confidential information about her
relationship with the defendant while they were
representing her minor son. . . . [The disqualification
rule] applies in this case because “[t]he issue is whether
plaintiffs’ counsel derived confidential information from
[his] former representation . . . which may disadvantage
the defendant in this case.” . . . Clearly, though the
plaintiff was not the true client of [the firm], she was, in
a significant manner, in the role of their client as she
acted as guardian for her minor son. The plaintiff has
stated that in the course of that representation, she
revealed to the attorney information regarding her
relationship with the defendant, which she claims could
be used to her detriment in the current action.118
The basis for a lawyer’s duty to a source who provides information
to facilitate the representation of a client is a relationship between the
source and the client coupled with provision of information.
G. A Third Party That, as the Lawyer Does or Should Realize, Will Rely on
the Accuracy of the Lawyer’s Factual Assertions for a Traditional Client
A lawyer represents a defendant charged with negligence for failing
to safely maintain the pavement in front of his property as a city
ordinance requires. The plaintiff is seeking $250,000. The lawyer tells
plaintiff’s counsel that the defendant is insured for only $100,000. The
defendant’s lawyer believes this is so because he has seen the insurance
policy with that limit. The plaintiff settles for the policy limit and
provides a general release. Later, it transpires that the defendant had a
115
116
117
118
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second policy for $300,000, which was available to the lawyer among the
defendant’s papers, but which the lawyer failed to discover. He was
wrong in what he told the plaintiff, but believed that what he said was
true. The plaintiff may or may not have further recourse against the
settling defendant personally. Our question is whether the plaintiff can
now sue the lawyer for negligent misrepresentation or another tort.
These facts are a variation of those in Slotkin v. Citizens Casualty Co.119
A child’s parents brought a medical malpractice action against the
hospital in which the child was born and others, alleging that the child
suffered neurological and brain damage as a result of professional
negligence at his birth.120 While the trial was in progress, but before a
verdict, the parties settled for $185,000.121 Counsel for the hospital made
certain representations to counsel for the plaintiffs.122 On one occasion,
the hospital’s lawyer said that he “knew” the hospital’s insurance
coverage was only $200,000.123 On another occasion, he said that this
was so “to the best of his knowledge.”124 In agreeing to the settlement,
the plaintiffs relied on these statements. It later transpired that the
hospital had a separate insurance policy for $1 million in addition to the
$200,000 policy to which its counsel was referring.125 Its counsel had
documents in his file (of which he claimed to be unaware) revealing the
excess coverage.126 After the settlement and after the plaintiffs learned
about the additional insurance coverage, they sued the hospital’s
counsel, among others, alleging fraud and related claims. Judgment
against the hospital’s lawyer was upheld. His “insistence that the policy
limit was $200,000…renders him liable under the New York definition of
scienter as reckless indifference to error, a pretense of exact knowledge,
or (an) assertion of a false material fact susceptible of accurate
knowledge but stated to be true on the personal knowledge of the
represnenter.”127

614 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 305.
121
Id. at 304.
122
Id. at 307.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 304.
126
Id. at 307.
127
Id. at 314. The complaint and the court characterized the lawyer’s conduct as “for
fraud, or its legal equivalent.” Id. at 304. But the basis for liability was not lying, but
recklessness.
Id. at 314. Today, the plaintiffs would likely sue for negligent
misrepresentation because 13 years after Slotkin, the New York Court of Appeals
recognized that a third party could assert such a claim against a lawyer despite the absence
119
120
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This category should be distinguished from formal opinion letters
that a lawyer writes to a third party to assist a client’s objectives. For
example, in a Colorado case, a borrower’s law firm sent an opinion letter
to the lending bank, stating the signator’s “opinion that the Town and
the Authority have adopted the Urban Renewal Plan in accordance with
requirements of the laws of the State of Colorado and the Charter of the
Town,” and that allegations in a pending lawsuit against the town were
therefore “without merit.”128 The court held that this language created a
duty to the lending bank that could support its action for negligent
misrepresentation.129 The difference between this case and Slotkin or
Rubin is the formality of the representation. Slotkin and Rubin arose out
of statements casually made in negotiation, whereas statements in the
Colorado case were formalized in a letter to the bank lending money to
the lawyer’s client.
The basis for the lawyer’s liability here is the relationship between
the recipient of the lawyer’s statement and the traditional client,
generally opposing parties in a transaction, which includes a settlement.
H. Summary
The seven categories and the basis for lawyer liability arising from
each are summarized in the following chart:

of privity. Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer &
Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318 (1992). The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 51(2) (2000) would also recognize this claim. See also Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn,
143 F.3d 263, 270 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Rubin was an action for securities fraud and
common law fraud against a borrower’s attorney, who defended on the ground that the
lender’s attorney had no right to rely on the borrower’s attorney’s factual statements. Id. at
265. The court responded:
That principle . . . .is limited to reliance on the opinions or research of
the other party’s attorney on points of law . . . .The theory is that one’s
own lawyer ought to be able to detect and cure misleading statements
of law from the other side. Extending the principle to factual
representations would put an investor in far greater peril in speaking
to an issuer’s counsel than in speaking with the president of the
company. In short, it would allow an attorney to mislead investors
with impunity. We cannot endorse this perverse result.
Id. at 270. An attorney in “a securities transaction,” the court said, “may not always be
under an independent duty to volunteer information about the financial condition of his
client, [but] he assumes a duty to provide complete and nonmisleading information with
respect to subjects on which he undertakes to speak.” Id. at 268.
128
See, e.g., Mehaffy, Ryder, Windholz & Wilson v. Central Bank of Denver, N.A., 892
P.2d 230, 237-38 (Colo. 1995).
129
Id.
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Basis for Duty to Virtual Clients

Common interest
arrangement

Relationship to client and
presumption of sharing of
relevant information

Affiliates of corporate client

Relationship to client or
relationship and proof of shared
information

Members of trade group
client

Relationship to client and
presumption of sharing of
relevant information

Principal of agent-client

Relationship to client

Third party beneficiary of
client

Relationship to client

A source of information to
the lawyer

Relationship to client and shared
information

Third party who relies on
lawyer’s statement

Relationship to client and lawyer
represents factual information

IV. RATIONALIZING AND CRITIQUING THE SEVEN CATEGORIES OF VIRTUAL
CLIENT
As stated, I make no claim that these seven categories comprise the
universe of situations in which lawyers may have “client like” duties to
third persons because of their professional work. I recognize, too, that
the categories overlap and certainly not all American jurisdictions view
them (or their boundaries) in the same way. Nonetheless, the categories
account for the great majority of circumstances giving rise to potential
liability (some more than others) and remarkably just two underlying
themes (a relationship between the traditional and virtual clients or a
relationship plus the fact or the presumption of shared information)
explain them all (although in the final category the information travels
from lawyer to virtual client).
When courts ascribe a duty of some dimension to a lawyer in one of
the circumstances described here, they create a default rule that governs
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if it is not displaced. A lawyer can often seek to contract around the
default rule by agreement with the traditional client or the putative
virtual client,130 but failing that, the duty arises.
My argument is that courts have adopted the wrong default rule in
some of these situations. They have done this without sufficient analysis
of pertinent policy considerations, looking only to one or both of the two
underlying conditions—relationship and information. But when and
why these conditions should afford virtual client status has been
inadequately addressed. Decisions whether to create lawyer-like duties
to persons or entities that are not traditional clients should be
approached with caution, though not forbidden, because of the potential
effect on the attorney-client relationship and the availability of the
lawyer (or her colleagues) to new clients. A presumption should
ordinarily work against creation with the burden of offering persuasive
policy justifications to create the default duty on the party seeking to
impose it. In meeting that burden, proponents should be required to
address three distinct questions: (a) whether the virtual (or nontraditional) client who seeks the benefit of the duty could readily have
negotiated for it; (b) the likely expectations, if nothing is said, of the
lawyer, his traditional client, and the party seeking to impose the duty;
and, (c) the effect of judicial creation of a duty to a virtual client on the
lawyer’s (and her firm’s) ability to represent the traditional client and
others who may seek their help. These factors are not meant to prescribe
a formula. They are considerations for analyzing the particular facts of
each matter. I will now apply the considerations to each of the seven
categories described above.
A. Common Interest Arrangements
Parties to common interest arrangements do not need a court’s help
in defining the duties, if any, owed them by lawyers for other clients in
the arrangements. Using the three questions described in the prior
paragraph, this is one of the easier conclusions. By definition, the
arrangement is contractual and each of the parties to the agreement has
counsel able to protect his or her client in the manner deemed best. The
130
If the default rule is to create the duty to the virtual client, the participants may be
able to waive the protection of that rule since a traditional client can waive the protection of
confidentiality rules or most conflict rules. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a),
1.7(b), 1.9(a)-(c) (2007). A virtual client should be able to do the same either directly or
through an agent (for example, a parent company) with authority. If, conversely, the
default rule would not recognize a duty to the putative virtual client, the parties can agree
to create one (for example, of confidentiality), but that agreement would be contractual. It
would not be imposed by rules of ethics.
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presumption should be against any duty to another lawyer’s client with
the parties free to defeat that presumption by defining specific
obligations. These may cover a fairly broad set of arrangements. For
example, the parties may agree that shared documents will be returned
to their source, that no lawyer will thereafter be adverse to clients of
other lawyers during the pendency of the arrangement (or ever) on the
subject of the common interest arrangement, or that no lawyer or client
will use or disclose any information from another lawyer or client in the
arrangement. But if nothing is said, and absent unusual circumstances
compelling a different conclusion, the presumption of no duty to other
lawyers’ clients, including for information they may have provided,
should be conclusive.
Using this test, Gabapentin131 appears to be wrong. The scope of any
obligation of each lawyer to the clients of the other lawyers is left
unclear. The court tells us that:
[a]n examination of the terms of the JDA reveals a clear
intent that any voluntarily-shared information would
remain confidential and be protected by the attorneyclient privilege. For example, the JDA states that the
signatories are required to ‘‘take all steps necessary to
maintain the privileged and confidential nature of the
information.’’132
What duty does the quoted JDA language impose? Is this promise
meant to forbid use of the information for the benefit of the lawyer’s own
client or only revelation? Is it meant to prevent pursuit of investigative
leads based on the information? The opinion goes on to find, from this
language of the JDA, that the lawyer for each of the defendants acquired
“a fiduciary and implied attorney-client relationship” with the clients of
other lawyers in the JDA.133 That is too broad. Fiduciary and attorneyclient relationships come with a lot of baggage and the potential for
significant civil liability. Here, the only objective was to protect
information so it would have sufficed for the court to recognize, at most,
a contractual duty of confidentiality. Furthermore, if the lawyers
accepted only a contractual (or even a fiduciary) obligation, there would
be no basis in the professional conduct rules for imputing their duty to

131
132
133

In re Gabapentin Pat. Lit., 407 F. Supp. 2d 607 (D.N.J. 2005).
Id. at 613-14.
Id. at 615.
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other lawyers at a successive law firm and then to disqualify their new
firm as the court did, relying on these rules.134
B. Affiliates of a Corporate Client
Obligations to the clients of other lawyers in common interest
arrangements can be defined by agreement. Self-help is readily
available. In theory, a law firm and a company that is part of a corporate
family should also be able to establish their own conflict rules by
agreement. For example, the retainer agreement can provide that, by
virtue of the representation of Parent, the law firm has no attorney-client
or fiduciary relationship with Subsidiaries. Or, conversely, a client can
request that the law firm accept an attorney-client relationship with (or
specific duties to) every company (or certain companies) in its corporate
family if it represents any member of it. To some extent, market power
will dictate the resolution. The firm whose expertise makes it highly
desirable in a matter can condition retention on its preferred
understanding of the relationship. The client with many lucrative
matters to offer can do the opposite. But this sort of private ordering of
conflict rules is not always easy in the corporate family context for two
reasons.
First, neither party may have the market power to insist on its
preference over the jurisdiction’s default rule. The firm may realize that
the client can go elsewhere and the client may realize that the value of its
business is insufficient to persuade any firm it may choose to agree to its
request. Second, a client’s agreement that retention of a firm does not
create an attorney-client relationship with or duties to other members of
its corporate family does not guarantee that a court will not decide
otherwise if unforeseen events (or at least events not foreseen in the
language of the retention agreement) arise in the course of the
representation. For example, while working for a parent, the firm may
ask a subsidiary to provide it with confidential information that it needs
to represent the parent. That event may, under current doctrine, create
certain duties to the subsidiary notwithstanding generic waiver language
in the earlier retainer agreement that did not specifically anticipate that
eventuality.

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a) (2007). Rule 1.10(a) imputes a conflict to
other lawyers if the conflict arises under “Rule 1.7 or 1.9.” Id. If the lateral lawyer’s
disability arises because of a contractual promise—or indeed even if it is fiduciary—he or
she is not “prohibited . . . by Rule 1.7 or 1.9” from representing the client and there should
be no imputation under Rule 1.10(a). Id.

134
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Where nothing is said, a jurisdiction can opt for either a more or a
less client-protective rule. In determining what the general default rule
should be, a jurisdiction cannot make assumptions about the
sophistication of the client or the availability of independent counsel to
advise it. Even though many companies that are part of a corporate
family will be sophisticated in the use of lawyers and will have inside
counsel to advise them, many others will not. Does this variation
support a more or a less protective rule? To put it another way: Which
party, client or lawyer, should have the burden to contract for a rule
more favorable to it?
Before considering what the rule should be, I return to the dominant
default rules today. They identify several circumstances that give rise to
duties to a corporate client’s affiliate, without regard to the size or
complexity of the corporate family or its access to independent counsel.
The circumstances fall into four categories. The first is any express or
implied agreement the parties may have.135 The second is what we
might call the “sharing” category—the client and its affiliates may share
one or more of the following: management, location, operation, and
information systems, or general counsel.136 Sharing in one or more of
these categories will not necessarily operate to create virtual client
identity,137 but it may, depending on the degree of sharing and other
factors. The third circumstance is the law firm’s receipt of confidential
information from the affiliate that is relevant to a new matter adverse to
the affiliate.138 The last is the economic effect of the work on the client
member of the corporate family.139

See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-390 (1995).
Id.
137
See, e.g., Apex Oil Co., Inc. v. Wickland Oil Co., No. CIV-S-94-1499-DFLGGH, 1995 WL
293944 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 1995) (the court meticulously analyzed the degree of overlap
between the personnel of two subsidiary companies of a common parent). Although a
common in-house lawyer supervised the work of both subsidiaries, the court declined “to
draw the inference that the corporate parent expected to be treated as a client where, except
for sharing the same corporate attorney, in all other respects . . . [the two] are distinct
companies.” Id. at *3.
138
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-390 (1995).
139
Id. The ABA Opinion recognizes a fifth basis for disqualification even when all of the
others are absent. Id. A lawyer for one member of a corporate family, say the parent, may
be reluctant to zealously represent a client that is adverse to another member of the
corporate family, say a subsidiary, for fear of antagonizing the parent. Id. That risk could
fall within Rule 1.7(a)(2), which states that “significant risk that the representation of one or
more clients will be materially limited by . . . a personal interest of the lawyer,” where the
personal interest would be the lawyer’s reluctance to antagonize a current client. But this
135
136
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Where the basis for a duty is in the first category, agreement that the
affiliate will be treated as a client, we simply have displacement of the
default rule by the contract and there will be no reason for the court to
apply a default rule that contradicts the agreement. Where the basis for
the duty is some degree of sharing, that circumstance will ordinarily be
known at the outset of the representation and can be specifically
recognized. The final two bases for creating a duty to an affiliate—
receipt of its relevant information or economic effect on the client
member of the corporate family—occur, if they occur at all, after the
professional relationship is formed; although sometimes either
possibility will be foreseeable at the outset.
Before deciding whether and when any of these circumstances
should inform a jurisdiction’s default rule, it makes sense to examine
some policies underlying the structure and content of lawyer ethics
rules. As stated earlier,140 the plurality if not the majority of ethical rules
can be likened to consumer protection laws. They protect clients, who
are after all consumers of the profession’s product, which is legal service.
Some rules protect adversaries, third parties, or the system of justice,
instead of or in addition to clients, but the plurality of rules protect
clients. Should not, then, the content of a court’s ethics rule meant to
protect clients be guided, at least in part, by assessing the client’s need
for court protection, which depends in part on the client’s sophistication
in the purchase of the product?141 Certainly some corporate clients are as
(or more) sophisticated in both the market for legal talent and lawyer
conflict of interest rules as (or than) are the lawyers they retain, and, in
consideration focuses on the danger to the client adverse to the non-client member of the
corporate family, not on any duty owed to the latter.
140
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
141
The idea of client sophistication has been more prominent of late, although the
rationale was always implicit. The idea is that a client who is sophisticated in the use of
lawyers needs less protection from the rules than does one who is not. This position may
appear in discussing the ability of a client to consent to a future conflict. See, e.g., ABA
Model Rule 1.7 cmt. 22; RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. d. See also
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a) (2007):
In determining whether the information and explanation provided are
reasonably adequate [to support the requirement of informed consent],
relevant factors include whether the client or other person is
experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the
type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently
represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such
persons need less information and explanation than others, and
generally a client or other person who is independently represented by
other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given
informed consent.
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fact, many corporate clients retain counsel under the supervision of other
lawyers who are especially knowledgeable and experienced consumers
of legal services. This obvious fact has not been accorded the influence it
deserves in defining the content of the rules governing corporate family
conflicts. We are haunted by the traditional model of the worldly lawyer
and the dependent (perhaps confused), needy (if not desperate) client at
the mercy of the lawyer’s sense of professional duty, or the lack of one.
Surely, many clients meet that description, but many do not.
Given vast differences in legal market savvy among corporate
clients, it seems misplaced for the same set of rules to govern duties to
affiliates of corporate clients regardless of client sophistication. Courts
should instead evaluate the need for protection before deciding what
default rule should govern a particular situation. Doing so does carry
the disadvantage of substituting complexity for simplicity; it is much
easier to apply a “one size fits all” rule. In exchange, though, when a
conflict is alleged, courts will be better able to allocate as between lawyer
and client who had the ex ante responsibility for negotiating a deviation
from the default rule. If we move away from a “one size fits all” rule,
many parties may not be able to predict, at retention, what default rule a
court will adopt ex post (but many will, among them large companies
with house counsel). That uncertainty should encourage them to resolve
the question in advance by agreement. When the default rule may be
less protective of a corporate client’s affiliates if nothing is said, the
client, if it cares about the question, is motivated to raise it. If the default
rule may be more protective of the corporate client’s affiliates, as it
would for corporate clients whom the court, under the circumstances,
finds less sophisticated in the market for legal services, it is the law firm
that has the motivation to displace it.
I will now suggest how a flexible default rule might work where the
basis for the conflict is (a) sharing arrangements, (b) receipt of the
affiliate’s information, and (c) economic effect.
Shared management, general counsel, location, and systems should
not be a basis to create duties to a corporate client’s affiliates where the
client is sophisticated in the employment of counsel. At the very least,
this test should not be mechanically applied. There are two reasons for
this. Compared to the law firm, the client is in a superior position at the
start of the professional relationship to know the degree of such sharing
among members of the corporate family. If it believes that its level of
integration requires (or causes it to desire) this protection, it should
request it or forego reliance on this basis in the event the law firm later
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appears adverse to affiliates.
Separately, the broad scope of
disqualification when based on sharing extends to foreclose
representation adverse to one or even many client affiliates on any
matter. If, for example, the affiliate who shares management with a
corporate client is for that reason deemed a client for conflict purposes,
no lawyer in the law firm can act adversely to the affiliate on any matter
while the professional relationship remains current. If all affiliates share
the same management—for example, all or most of the topmost control
group—the law firm may not be able to oppose any of the affiliates,
regardless of number, on any matter for the duration of the
representation of a single member of the corporate family. If a
sophisticated corporate client wants that level of protection, a level that
severely circumscribes the firm’s availability, it should have to bargain
for it. It should not receive it by operation of a categorical rule or ex post
via a court decision.
I will now turn to receipt of an affiliate’s confidential information in
the course of representing a member of its corporate family as a basis to
forbid representation adverse to the affiliate. Here the scope of the
disqualification is narrow. It is only on matters where the received
information is relevant that the firm is disqualified from opposing the
affiliate. On the other hand, the particular conflict will continue even
after the representation of the corporate family member has ended. But
here, too, a categorical prohibition may produce an inequitable result.
For one thing, when a law firm receives information from a corporate
client it may not always be clear who, within the corporate family, owns
the information. Information does not necessarily come with a label. We
can call this the “ownership” issue. Second, even for information that
originally came from the affiliate, the client may independently have the
information, in which case the affiliate will not itself have been asked to
produce anything that could later be used against it. Where the
ownership or source of the information is unclear, a law firm under the
current default rule may be unaware that receipt of the information will
disqualify it from relevant matters adverse to the affiliate, with the result
that another client will lose its chosen lawyer.
By contrast, the client will not ordinarily labor under this lack of
clarity. It will know to whom information belongs and the source of the
information. Consequently, receipt of relevant information should not
be an automatic basis to disqualify a law firm. Rather, for that basis to
apply the circumstances should make it clear that the firm knows or
should have known the provenance of the information. Only then is the
firm able to negotiate for a less strict conflict rule should it wish to be
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free to appear adverse to the affiliate in a matter where the information is
relevant.142 Where this clarity is absent, the burden to identify the
ownership of the information should fall on the corporate client; if it
does not do so, it must accept that the law firm will not be prevented
from appearing adverse to the affiliate in a relevant matter.143
The final basis to forbid representation adverse to a client’s affiliate
is the economic effect of the matter on the client, if successful. This basis
has a checkered history. There is authority for the proposition that it
should not be a basis at all and authority for the proposition that it is a
basis when the economic consequences are large.144 Even the ABA
opinion that rejected this as a basis for conflict recognized that adversity
against a client’s affiliate in a matter that could prove harmful to the
economic health of the client may be the basis for disqualification, not
because of the economic harm per se, but because the prospect of
significant economic harm caused by a company’s own law firm (albeit
in unrelated matters) could undermine the trust and confidence that is
essential to the professional relationship and that the client has a right to
enjoy.145 In those jurisdictions prepared to recognize substantial
economic harm to the client as a result of representation adverse to one
of its affiliates—and I believe it is a legitimate basis for identifying a
conflict if used with caution—the risk of this eventuality will ordinarily
be theoretical and equally apparent to lawyer and client in the formation
of the attorney-client relationship. Consequently, either is in a position
to negotiate for a different rule and neither is likely to have superior
142
Often, the law firm will not be able to decline to receive the information, even if it is
alerted to its source, because it will need the information to competently represent the
client member of the corporate family. At those times, however, at the very least the firm
will be on notice of the limitations of its representation and can plan accordingly.
143
The law firm, of course, remains obligated not to reveal or adversely use the
information. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c) (1983) (amended 2003).
144
See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
145
The ABA Opinion is cursory in identifying this risk, but it is recognized. ABA Comm.
on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 95-390 (1995). It states that a “lawyer must
consider whether the representation . . . of the corporate client may be materially limited by
the representation of the client adverse to the affiliate.” Id. The point is simply that the
client has a right to expect to be able to work in an atmosphere of trust and confidence with
its law firm. Id. at 298. When that same law firm is adverse to an affiliate in a manner that
can cause the client substantial economic harm, this may not be possible. Of course, the
test cannot be the offended client’s own comfort level. If it were, the rules would be
entirely subjective and open to manipulation. Rather, the perspective for determining
whether the adverse representation so undermines the professional relationship with the
client member of the corporate family must be objective. See RESTATEMENT OF LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. C (iv) (“This Section employs an objective standard by
which to assess the adversariness, materiality, and substantiality of the risk of the effect on
representation”).
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knowledge.146 A default rule that preserves this basis for disqualification
is therefore appropriate. That rule does nothing more than recognize the
client’s—any client’s—right to expect to work with a lawyer in an
atmosphere of trust and confidence and that, using objective criteria,
such right will be compromised when the lawyer or his or her firm is
opposing an affiliate of the client in a matter that could cause the client
substantial economic harm.
C. Members of a Lawyer’s Trade Group Client
Corporate clients need legal counsel for their own problems whether
or not they also happen to be members of a corporate family. Trade
organizations need legal counsel, too, but with a difference. Some of
their legal needs will be the routine ones incident to running any
organization. These include real estate, tax, employment, and the
ordinary run of tort liability matters. But often the need will stem from
the work the group does for its members. The trade group exists for the
direct benefit of others, its members. Its “business” is the pursuit of its
members’ interests. Whether technically an agent for its members or not,
its role is instrumental. Its members have decided that certain of their
own political, commercial, or legal objectives can be usefully pursued
(though not necessarily exclusively) through an entity that represents
their common interests. A lawyer retained by a trade group knows that,
and knows, too, or should know, that much of the information the client
imparts will have its source in the files of its members. For example, a
lobbying effort may draw on proprietary commercial data from a
group’s members, data not publicly available and the specifics of which
may not become public in the lobbying endeavor. When a law firm for a
trade group (or similar entity) gets member-specific proprietary
information, it must or should know that members have provided the
information to the group in order to advance the interests of the
membership including their own.
For these reasons, it is appropriate to have a default rule that treats
the members of a trade group as virtual clients of the group’s law firm to
the extent of prohibiting the law firm from acting adversely to a member
in any matter in which a member’s information is relevant and the law
firm obtained that information in its work for the trade group. In Glueck,
the Second Circuit inferred that Philips Nizer had received Jonathan
Logan’s confidential information from the fact that the law firm
146
On rare occasion, a law firm may have superior knowledge, as when it is
contemplating an action of substantial magnitude against a client’s affiliate.
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represented a trade association in which Jonathan Logan was a member
in an area of law (labor relations) that was the subject of the litigation
against Jonathan Logan. The court was not only influenced by the risk to
information the defendant may have given the firm, it also apprehended
that Jonathan Logan would thereafter be inhibited from sharing
information with the firm lest that information be used against it in
Glueck. The disqualification therefore rested on two presumptions—a
presumption of a threat to imparted information and a presumption of
inhibition against providing additional information—and these
presumptions in turn depended on the fact that both representations
were in the same area of law. This inference is reasonable on the facts of
Glueck, but it is prone to false positives (i.e., finding a threat to
information or an inhibition when none exists) if too casually applied.
Consequently, for the default rule to protect the trade association
member, a court should insist on a close fit between the two
representations.147 The disqualification of the firm would not extend to
other matters in which it may appear adversely to the member and
where the information is not relevant. It is true that the members of a
trade group, especially those who work closely with a law firm for the
group, might prefer that the firm be forbidden to appear adversely to
them in any matter at all. But, for two reasons, it does not make sense to
adopt so broad a prohibition as the default rule. First, some trade groups
are large and so the scope of the disqualification and attendant denial of

147
The Glueck court did not closely analyze the fit between Phillips Nizer’s legal work for
a trade association and the case before it. Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653 F.2d 746 (2d
Cir. 1981). On behalf of the association, the firm conducted multi-employer collective
bargaining with a union. Id. Glueck was an executive of one of the association members –
Logan – not a member of the union. Id. Yet the court concluded:
Judge Conner [the district judge] relied upon the risk that the issue of
whether Logan had cause to terminate Glueck might well arise in the
course of collective bargaining discussions conducted by Phillips Nizer
for the Association. He also noted the risk that in preparing for
collective bargaining sessions, the law firm might learn of Logan’s
policies or past practices bearing on the subject of Glueck’s
termination.
These risks demonstrate the requisite relationship
between Glueck’s lawsuit and the subject matter of Phillips Nizer’s
representation of the Association.
Id. at 750 (emphasis added).
This conclusion is highly suppositional with predictions founded on what “might” or
“might well” happen. It would be different if Glueck were in the union with which the law
firm was bargaining, but he was not. Rights of union members and Glueck’s claims as an
executive would seem distinct.
Of course, the court also cited other bases for
disqualification. It may be, of course, that the risk was great enough to warrant
disqualification, but the suppositions in the circuit opinion do not support that conclusion.
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choice of counsel and limitation on practice would be large.148 Keeping
counsel available is a value that deserves respect, though not unqualified
deference. Second, as a sophisticated employer of legal services, the
trade group (whose governing board is likely to be composed
exclusively or largely of some of its members and which may have inhouse counsel as well) can negotiate for the broader prohibition at the
outset of the retention. The issue is not hidden and the client (and its
members) is likely to be sophisticated about these matters.149
D. Beneficiaries and Reliers
This is an inclusive group, meant to identify the common
denominator in the final four categories of virtual clients. Again, those
four categories are: (i) the principal of an agent-client (or beneficiary of a
fiduciary client) who has hired the lawyer to assist in protecting the
principal (or beneficiary); (ii) intended third party beneficiaries of a legal
service performed for a client; (iii) a third party who gives a lawyer
confidential information to assist in providing legal services for a
traditional client because of the nature of the relationship between the
source and the traditional client; and, (iv) a specific third party that, as
the lawyer does or should know, will rely on the accuracy of the lawyer’s
factual assertions or legal analysis on behalf of a traditional client. The
common denominator is this: in each situation, the lawyer knows or
should know that the work, at least in part and perhaps entirely, is
intended either to benefit or to influence someone besides the immediate
and traditional client. In at least one of these situations, the third, the
beneficiary of the work has, in addition, provided the lawyer with
information to facilitate the work. That may also be true in the first two
situations. For example, the beneficiary of a fiduciary client may have
provided the lawyer with information—directly, or indirectly through
the fiduciary—to assist his or her work for the fiduciary.
148
For example, the United States Internet Industry Association, founded in 1994, claims
more than 200 members. U.S. Internet Industry Association, http://www.usiia.org/
about/fact.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2008). The Association of American Publishers had 314
members as of 2005. Association of American Publishers, Annual Report for Fiscal Year
2004/2005, http://www.pubilshers.org/about/annualreport.cfm (last visited Nov. 4,
2007). The American Seed Trade Association web site reports that it has “about 850
member companies, including roughly 550 active members.” American Seed Trade
Association, About ASTA, http://www.amseed.com/about.asp (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
149
As discussed supra text accompany notes 83-92, an additional basis for conflict would
be (1) if the lawyer’s interest in maintaining a good relationship with the trade group client
compromised the lawyer’s ability to represent a client adverse to a member of the trade
group, or (2) if representation adverse to a member of the trade group that was active in the
affairs of the group, including the need to work with a lawyer, undermined the ability of
the trade group client to have trust and confidence in its law firm.
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In each of these situations, the presumptive default rule should
ordinarily give the lawyer professional duties to the virtual client
although those duties need not and generally will not be the full
complement of duties a lawyer owes to a traditional client. As before,
complexity precludes a single metric across all four of the situations or
even for each one. In exchange for the loss of simplicity, we get rules
that respond to factual differences.
While this will diminish
predictability, we should keep in mind that the chosen default rules in
each instance will favor the party most in need of protection, in part
because of lack of sophistication in the market for legal services and in
part because of the equities of the situation, and that, as with other
default rules, they can be displaced with appropriate informed consent.
Furthermore, predictability is not lost entirely. Variations in the factual
circumstances can be identified ex ante and appropriately weighted in
deriving the probable default rule.
Before discussing each of the variations within this collective
category, that of beneficiaries and reliers, I want to return to the second
canonical assumption referenced earlier.150 It is that judicially created
“client-like” duties to third parties should be an exception because they
threaten to compromise the zeal with which the lawyer will champion
the traditional client’s goals. They will do this, the argument goes,
because lawyers who face a risk of liability to third parties will temper
their devotion to the traditional client’s matter to avoid that risk.
Litigation is where this model works best. Certainly, we should not
create duties to a litigation client’s adversaries beyond those necessary to
protect against discovery abuse, fraud on the court, and other systemic
harms. These duties run to the justice system, with the adversary as
beneficiary. They are not what I am calling “client-like” duties, that is,
duties that lawyers owe traditional clients such as competence,
confidentiality, and freedom from conflicts of interest.
Outside litigation, recognizing “client-like” duties in the four
situations under discussion should not be seen to threaten the lawyer’s
loyalty to the objectives of his or her traditional client. Consequently, in
these situations, with qualifications discussed below, a lawyer should
have: (i) a duty of competence to the principal (or beneficiary) of an
agent (or fiduciary) client and also the duty to protect the principal or
beneficiary from the agent’s or fiduciary’s disloyalty; (ii) a duty of
competence to intended third party beneficiaries of legal services for a
client; (iii) a duty to specified sources of information to refrain from
150

See supra text accompanying note 11.
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adverse representation in a matter where the information is relevant;
and, (iv) a duty of care to third parties who, the lawyer does or should
realize, will rely on the accuracy of the lawyer’s statements of fact.
Generally, none of these duties will detract from the zeal with which the
lawyer pursues the client’s goals, but they should prevail even if they do.
Further, in the first and second instances, and to some extent in the third
and fourth, the party claiming virtual client status will often not have
been in a position to negotiate for protection.
1.

The Principal or Beneficiary of an Agent or Fiduciary Client151

Where an agent or other fiduciary retains a lawyer for the specific
purpose of obtaining legal advice in order to benefit the principal or
beneficiary, the lawyer should have a duty of competence to the
principal or beneficiary and a duty to protect him or her in the event of a
violation of fiduciary duty. The lawyer should also be excluded from
appearing adversely to the principal in any matter in which information
obtained from the principal, directly or through the agent, is relevant.
Today, the exceptions to confidentiality in ABA Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) and
(3) go only a modest way toward enabling a lawyer to protect the
principal from injury by the agent. These exceptions are permissive
only; further, they require that the lawyer’s work have been used in
causing the injury. They also require that the conduct causing the injury
be the result of a fraud or crime and that the injury be “substantial.”152
a.

Competence

We are assuming that the agent or other fiduciary has retained the
lawyer to advise it in protecting the interests of the principal. It would
seem, then, that the interests of the agent and the interests of the
principal in competent legal advice are congruent. Indeed, because the
principal is the one who will personally benefit from the lawyer’s work,
the principal’s interest in competence would seem to be greatest.
Further, by giving the principal a right of action against the lawyer for
malpractice, we should in no way affect the quality of the lawyer’s work
for the agent since the agent also wants competence. We might

151
The assumption here is that the lawyer has been retained for the specific purpose of
obtaining legal advice in order to benefit the principal or beneficiary. Where the agent or
fiduciary is retaining the lawyer because his or her interests have become adverse or
potentially adverse to the principal or beneficiary—that is, where the agent or fiduciary has
a personal need for counsel—the lawyer’s sole professional obligation should run to the
agent or fiduciary.
152
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(2), (3).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss3/3

Gillers: Virtual Clients: An Idea in Search of a Theory (with Limits)

2008]

Virtual Clients

841

analogize this situation to an agent who employs a subagent for the
benefit of the principal. The subagent, as a fiduciary of the principal,
will have a duty of care to the principal.153 It is important to stress again
what this category does not involve. The assumption is that the agent
has hired the lawyer because the agent needs legal counsel for the
ultimate benefit of the principal. This is not a situation where the agent
seeks counsel personally or because of a divergence between its interests
and those of the principal.
b.

Fiduciary Misconduct

Much has been written about whether and when a lawyer should be
permitted or required to reveal client communications to protect a third
person from injury from a client’s crime or fraud.154 The Model Rules
now permit a lawyer to reveal confidences when the third person’s
financial injury is substantial and the lawyer has been used (or misused)
in the client’s misconduct.155 Whatever the merits of permissive rather
than mandatory disclosure, or of conditioning the lawyer’s authority to
reveal client confidential information on the client having used the
lawyer’s services to commit the crime or fraud, where the person injured
is a principal or beneficiary and the lawyer has been retained to benefit
the principal through assistance to the agent (or other fiduciary), the
lawyer should be required to warn the principal without regard to
whether the lawyer’s services have been used in causing the injury. The
principal in this situation is not the “third person” usually imagined in
routine discussions of this exception to confidentiality. The principal, we
might say, is the ultimate client: the intended recipient of the value of
the lawyer’s labor. I suppose all would agree that the lawyer who
stumbles on the agent’s breach of fiduciary duty would at the very least
have to resign if remaining had the effect of advancing the misconduct.
But that might be insufficient notice of dereliction to the principal. One
compromise would require the lawyer to inform the principal that he or
she has resigned “for professional reasons,” in the expectation that doing
so will lead the principal to investigate. This is but a variation on the
noisy withdrawal authority long contained in the comments to the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY: DUTIES OF AGENT AND PRINCIPLE TO EACH OTHER
§ 8.01 cmt. c (2006). “A subagent owes fiduciary duties to the principal as well as to the
appointing agent.” Id.; see also id. at § 3.15(1), cmt. d.
154
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 1.13 (1983) (amended 2003). Much
of this debate was sparked by the ABA’s adoption of new exception to confidentiality. See
also Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility and the 2003
Changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 35 (2003).
155
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3).
153
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Model Rules.156 But why muzzle the lawyer from revealing the specifics?
A second compromise would authorize but not require the lawyer to
reveal the agent’s dereliction. But why not mandate revelation given the
fiduciary duty?
The point here, again, is that the principal stands in a posture
different from the usual “third person” envisioned by ethics rules, and
the lawyer stands in a different posture to the principal than lawyers
stand in relation to third persons to whom clients do not owe a fiduciary
duty. The situation here is instead closer to the lawyer for an entity who
discovers misconduct among its officers and who is then required to
report to higher officials. True, there is a difference because the officers
are not the lawyer’s clients while the agent is, but on the assumption
made (the purpose of the lawyer’s retention is to benefit the principal),
the agent is a client only as a “pass through” for the benefit of the
principal, so this distinction should not matter.
2.

Third Party Beneficiaries of a Legal Service

The premise here is that the interests of the client and the interests of
the third party are either the same or at least that the interests of the
latter are wholly “lesser included” within (and so consistent with) the
interests of the former. The client’s intention, in other words, is that the
third party should benefit from the legal service, perhaps along with the
client. The classic example is the beneficiary under a will. But there will
be other examples. A purchaser of real estate may want title to pass to a
specific third person on death or on a certain occurrence. A divorce
client may want to insure that her children remain as beneficiaries under
their father’s life insurance policy or that the father will have a legal
obligation, not otherwise present, to pay for a certain benefit, like college
or graduate school. Or, in a different vein, a shareholder in a corporation
may hire a lawyer to perform a service that will benefit the corporation
(as well as the shareholder).157 In these and like circumstances, the
traditional reason for refusing to recognize a duty, here of competence,
to the third party has scant validity. It cannot compromise the lawyer’s
commitment to the traditional client to give the intended beneficiary of
that client’s retainer legal standing to require competent work (as the
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 10, 4.1 cmt. 3 (1983) (amended 2003).
See, e.g., Williams v. Mordkofsky, 901 F.2d 158, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (corporation had
standing to sue a lawyer who had been retained by its shareholders and an affiliated
company for the purpose of benefitting the corporation; lawyer “knew or should have
known that . . . [corporation] would be directly affected by his advice in regard to the
[matter]”).

156
157
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default rule), because that is exactly what the traditional client also
wants. It bears stressing that the third party is not a stranger to the
work—not someone who incidentally will stand to benefit, as it happens,
from the work—but someone whom the client hired the lawyer
specifically to benefit, at least in part.158
3.

A Third Party Source of Information

As stated,159 this category does not sweep within its protection any
third party who gives a lawyer information useful in the representation
of a client.160 It further requires a particular relationship between the
source and the client that has encouraged the source to provide the
information. That relationship may, for example, be parent and child.
While a parent may not legally benefit when the representation of a client
is successful, thereby distinguishing the prior category, the parent’s
interests are satisfied simply because of the relationship. Indeed, it is the
relationship that predictably encourages the parent to provide the
information in the first place. In the commercial world, similarly, an
employer may provide confidential information to an employee’s lawyer
because success for the employee directly benefits the employer. We
saw an example of each instance of these—familial and commercial—
above.161 In each, the fact of the information then prevented the lawyer
from acting adversely to the source in a matter in which the information
was relevant (and therefore could be used against the source). That was
true even when the client of the lawyer in the (later) adverse matter was
the same (traditional) client as in the prior matter.
Admittedly, this category has vague borders. What relationships
will create a duty to the information source? What if there is adversity or
the obvious potential for adversity at the time the information is
supplied? For the default rule to impose a duty to the source of
information, the appropriate test should require that the source: (a)
stands directly to benefit from the lawyer’s work, but the benefit need
not be to a legal or commercial position; (b) is motivated to provide the
information because of that expected benefit; and, (c) is not benefitting
simply because it is a member of the public.
Id. at 163 (“The third party, however, must allege more than mere harm from the
conduct in question. He must show in addition that he was ‘the direct and intended
beneficiary of the attorney-client relationship.’”) (citing Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d
1060, 1062-63 (D.C. 1983).
159
See supra Part III.F.
160
See supra Part III.F.
161
See supra Part III.F.
158
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A Third Party Who Relies on the Lawyer’s Assertions or Analysis

This category must be distinguished from formal opinion letters, by
which I mean letters whose circumstances clearly signal to the lawyer
that he or she is making a statement about the facts or the law to a third
person who is expected to rely on or draw comfort from the statement. It
may be a letter that the recipient, often an opponent of the traditional
client in a transaction, has requested as a condition of the transaction.162
Under these circumstances, no policy argues against requiring the
lawyer to be free from negligent error. While any claim arising from
reliance on representations that prove false may be labeled negligent
misrepresentation, the proof will be similar if not identical to the proof a
traditional client might mount in a legal malpractice claim based on
negligence.163
The distinct but related situation I mean to encompass with this
category entails less formality. Whereas, with formal opinion letters, the
lawyer does know the context for the representations, here the lawyer
may not fully appreciate the context. Yet it is a precondition to liability
for negligence that the recipient was entitled to rely on what the lawyer
said. We are not here discussing predictions or claims of value, but
statements of fact or law.
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Baik164 may push the outer limits of
negligent misrepresentation based on statements of fact or law to a third
person. Anderson, Burrows & Galbraith prepared the federal and state
tax returns for a decedent’s estate (in addition to performing other legal
work for the estate).165 One asset of the estate was residential property,
which the estate quitclaimed to the decedent’s brother and his wife, who
then sold the property to their two sons and their wives.166 The
purchasers applied for a mortgage, and the lender required title

162
See, e.g., Mehaffy, Rider, Whindholz & Wilson v. Central Bank of Denver, N.A., 892
P.2d 230 (Colo. 1995) (an opinion letter need not be dressed up in any particular way). See
also Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987). The lawyer for the borrower told
the lender, who had required his opinion, that the collateral was “free and clear of all liens
or encumbrances.” Id. at 1562. It was not, and following default the lender successfully
sued the lawyer. Id. at 1568.
163
Id. The court concluded that Illinois law, which applied, would have supported a
professional malpractice claim, but the lender was also free to sue for negligent
misrepresentation. Id. “We know of no obstacle to such an election; nothing is more
common in American jurisprudence than overlapping torts.” Id.
164
55 P.3d 619 (Wash. 2002).
165
Id. at 620.
166
Id.
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insurance.167 Lawyers Title offered the insurance but excluded any taxes
the estate might owe.168 The policy of Lawyers Title was to remove this
exclusion if the estate’s law firm stated “that no estates taxes were
due.”169 Chae, a lawyer at the Anderson firm, wrote the following in a
letter to Lawyers Title: “I am informing you that, based on our tax
preparation, no estate taxes are due and owing to the state or federal
government. Likewise, to my knowledge, no other taxes are outstanding
against the estate.”170 Lawyers Title issued the policy. As it turned out,
the statement that no taxes were due was wrong.171 The federal
government filed a lien against the residential property and Lawyers
Title paid the IRS more than $618,000 in taxes, penalty, and interest.172
Lawyers Title then sued the Anderson law firm (among others) for
negligent misrepresentation.173
By a vote of 4-3, the Washington Supreme Court reversed a
summary judgment motion in favor of the law firm. The court
addressed several issues, but most interesting for our purposes is how it
dealt with the firm’s argument that the statement in the letter to Lawyers
Title was not false and, therefore, not a misrepresentation. The law firm
claimed that its statement to Lawyers Title was literally true; that is, that
“based on [its] tax preparation, no estate taxes” were due. The law firm
did not categorically say that no estate taxes were due, only that its work
revealed none. The court rejected that argument:
The respondents argue that Lawyers Title’s negligent
misrepresentation claim fails because, “[a]s a matter of
law, Mr. Chae made no false representations” in his
opinion letter to Lawyers Title. . . . The respondents’
approach to the “false information” element of a
negligent misrepresentation claim would immunize all
communications that were explicitly (or even arguably)
presented as opinions. Every defendant would claim
that he or she had accurately and truthfully stated his or
her opinion, and the content of even the most
negligently obtained opinion would go unexamined:
whether the opinion had been derived by tossing a coin
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Id. at 622.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 623.
Id.
Id.
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or consulting an astrologer would be of no consequence,
so long as the letter accurately stated the opinions that
those methods had yielded. The respondents’ selfserving approach is plainly at odds with
the . . . conception [in Restatement (Second) of Torts
§552] of the “false information” element of a negligent
misrepresentation claim.174
Strengthening a duty to the recipient here is that the word of
lawyers, being lawyers, will carry special weight. Others will presume
accuracy (care) and integrity. Courts have emphasized the credibility
that a lawyer’s status carries and have supported claims for damages in
part based on it. For example, as in the Slotkin case,175 lawyers for
defendants have been sued for misstating the amount of their client’s
insurance coverage. In Fire Ins. Exchange v. Bell,176 the Indiana Supreme
Court held “as a matter of law” that the opposing counsel had a right to
rely on an insurance coverage statement.177 It rejected the argument that
there was no right to rely because the relationship was adverse or
because opposing counsel could have discovered the true coverage on
his own. The court emphasized that the incorrect statement was made
by lawyers:
A lawyer’s representations have long been accorded a
particular
expectation
of
honesty
and
trustworthiness. . . . The reliability of lawyers’
representations is an integral component of the fair and
efficient administration of justice. The law should
promote lawyers’ care in making statements that are
accurate and trustworthy and should foster the reliance
upon such statements by others.178
The Supreme Court of Iowa has similarly stressed the lawyer’s duty (and
risks) in this situation, again relying on the speaker’s status as a lawyer:
We hold that once a lawyer responds to a request for
information in an arm’s length transaction and
undertakes to give that information, the lawyer has a
duty to the lawyer requesting the information to give it
174
175
176
177
178
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Id. at 624-25.
Slotkin v. Citizens Casualty Co., 614 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1979).
643 N.E.2d 310 (Ind. 1994).
Id. at 313.
Id. at 312-13.
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truthfully. Such a duty is an independent one imposed
for the benefit of a particular person or class of persons.
We further hold that a breach of that duty supports a
claim of equitable indemnity by the defrauded lawyer
against the defrauding lawyer. 179
V. CONCLUSION
In the three decades since Judge Sprecher’s acute observation,
ambiguity over who may be entitled to a lawyer’s professional concern—
who has a claim to some component of “clienthood”—has increased
beyond what the judge or anyone at the time could have imagined. The
field will never be as clear as it once was, say, circa 1950. Yet lawyers
must plan because errors can lead to disqualification or liability for
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. They can try to reach
agreements that anticipate the question, but that will get them only so
far. Some developments cannot be foreseen. Even when prediction is
possible, lawyers may be unwilling to ask clients or others to accept
terms that may appear unduly one-sided in the lawyer’s favor. Lawyers
have to accept that a person or entity that is not a formal client can make
a claim to occupy one of the virtual client categories. Of course, a claim
is not a right, only the possibility of one. If the lawyer cannot resolve the
claim when it arises, he or she must weigh the degree of risk and
consequences of guessing wrong.
Like any client caught in the whorl of developing legal doctrine,
lawyers may bemoan the absence of bright lines. That is understandable,
but the dilemma is here to stay. It will not arise often. The clients of
most lawyers most of the time will still be the person who walks in the
door. But what the doctrines described here tell us is that the door is not
the only point of entry to a professional relationship.

179
Hansen v. Anderson, Wilmarth & Van Der Maaten, 630 N.W.2d 818, 825-26 (Iowa
2001).
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